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INTRODUCTION

Scholarship in civil procedure traditionally has dealt with the
subject as if it were a discrete, essentially apolitical and technical
area of the law, largely autonomous from the more overtly political, substantive law. While traditional scholarship regards civil
procedure as policy driven, the policies are treated as if they were
uniquely or especially procedural.1
Civil procedure, however, no less than substantive law, can be
intensely ideological. That is, civil procedure doctrine is shaped by
the same ideological debates that dominate substantive law. Developments in procedural doctrine thus parallel developments in substantive doctrine because both reflect larger shifts in legal ideology.
This essay is a preliminary examination of the influence of
ideology on civil procedure. To keep the inquiry within a manageable scope, I have limited the discussion to two topics which are
staples of the standard first year civil procedure course: personal
jurisdiction and provisional remedies. These topics are united by
the fact that their study in the first year of law school usually emphasizes the limitations that the Due Process Clause places on civil
I

See, e.g.,

GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR.

&

JAN VETTER, PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

(1987) (anthology of civil procedure articles); ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)

(most theoretical of all major civil procedure casebooks).
Nor is this view of civil procedure confined to the academy. One commentator has argued that Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), represents the first time in the
modern era that the Supreme Court decided a personal jurisdiction case without relying
solely on arguments peculiar to procedural law, but "brought into play themes relating more
generally to constitutional theory." Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Theory-A Comment on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGER L.J. 689, 689
(1991).

19931

IDEOLOGY

procedure doctrine. That has been my focus as well. This essay
thus could be characterized as a study of the influence of ideology
on the application of the Due Process Clause to civil procedure
doctrine.
The discussion is organized principally along historical lines.
Part One discusses the late nineteenth century, the era when the
Due Process Clause first was applied to personal jurisdiction doctrine. The discussion comprises two sections. The first explicates
some of the major themes of the conservative ideology which dominated 2 late nineteenth century legal thought and describes a number of ways in which those themes were reflected in the substantive
legal doctrine of that era. The second shows how those same
themes also were reflected in Pennoyer v. Neff,' the landmark 1877
Supreme Court decision holding that the Due Process Clause limits state court exercises of personal jurisdiction.
Part Two discusses the mid-twentieth century and again comprises two sections. The first describes the emergence of a liberal
ideology which rejected many of the major themes of late nineteenth century conservatism and which, by the middle of the twentieth century, had become dominant in American legal thought. It
also discusses how the rise of mid-twentieth century liberalism was
reflected in changes in substantive law. The second section demonstrates that those same themes transformed the doctrine of personal jurisdiction in ways which exactly paralleled developments in
the substantive law.
Part Three argues that a resurgence of conservative ideology
on the Supreme Court in the last third of the twentieth century
has been reflected in all of the major personal jurisdiction cases
decided in that period. Using arguments characteristic of their late
nineteenth century counterparts, the late twentieth century conservatives have halted and, to some extent, reversed the liberal
2 In characterizing each of the ideologies as dominant in a particular period, I am not
suggesting that all court decisions of that period were consistent with the dominant ideology. Throughout the period of conservative dominance in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, judges and scholars were engaged in challenging the premises of that
ideology and formulating a liberal alternative. Conservatism lost its dominance by a gradual
process in which courts increasingly decided cases in a way that was consistent with this
newly formulated liberal ideology. By the mid-twentieth century, the liberal ideology was
dominant, although some judges and scholars continued to adhere to many of the tenets of
late nineteenth century conservatism. For an example of the gradual erosion of conservative

ideology, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
3 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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transformation of the prior decades.
Part Four analyzes the four most important Supreme Court
cases in the area of provisional remedies. All but one were decided
in the mid-1970s, at the very time when the ideological character
of the Court was shifting from liberal to conservative. It demonstrates that the opinions in these cases reflect the same ideological
divisions that characterize the personal jurisdiction cases.
I.

A.

LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

Substantive Law

The conservative political ideology of the late nineteenth century had both a political and a jurisprudential dimension. 4 As will
be seen, the two dimensions were mutually reinforcing.'
1. The Political Dimension: Deference to the Market
The political dimension was based on the premise that law
should protect individual liberties and rights, especially property
rights. The primary threat to individual property rights was government regulation. The law thus should be constructed so as to
limit government interference with private economic activity.
The corollary was that individual property rights were not
threatened by private activity, at least to any degree sufficient to
require extensive regulation. Individuals were presumed to be free
and equal, in the absence of government intervention, with the result that private activity generally would not coerce or limit the
freedom of individuals. Thus, the role of the government was primarily to facilitate rather than to regulate private economic
conduct.
Consistent with these premises, late nineteenth century conThis discussion of conservative ideology draws on the following works, although the

authors may or may not agree with my synthesis: GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 3-62 (1977); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATrrruDES
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1980);
Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 (1975); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976);
William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1974); Elizabeth Mensch,
The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 13 (David Kairys ed.,
1990).
5 See generally Kennedy, supra note 4.
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servatives concluded that the government should defer as much as
possible to decisions made by the market. This view was intrinsically conservative, since it essentially ratified the existing distribution of wealth. Property should be redistributed, if at all, by market transactions and not by government regulation. Because
market transactions were presumed to be voluntary, market-based
redistributions of wealth were not inconsistent with protecting individual freedom.
These political tenets of late nineteenth century conservative
ideology were reflected in both private law and public law. As will
be seen, courts modified both the common law and constitutional
law to insulate private economic activity from government
regulation.
a. Private Law: The Requirement of Volition
In private law, the desire to protect individual autonomy from
government regulation was reflected in the principle that all liability should be based on some form of volitional conduct by the defendant-whether technically described as intentional conduct,
negligence or consent. This principle explains and unifies a number
of important changes in the common law during the late nineteenth century.
First, some areas of liability were taken out of tort law and
placed in the realm of contract. In Thomas v. Winchester,6 for example, the New York Court of Appeals adopted a widely followed
rule that manufacturers were not liable to injured consumers for
defective products unless the manufacturer and consumer were in
privity of contract. Personal injuries caused by defective products
thus were actionable primarily under a theory of contract and not
7

tort.

Contract was the preferred mode of judicial intervention in
private affairs because liability was based on relatively overt forms
of consent. Indeed, some form of contract law was an essential prerequisite to the functioning of a market. Liability in contract thus
a 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
7 Thomas did not preclude an action against the manufacturer for fraud. At the time
Thomas was decided, however, fraud would lie only where the vendor made some affirmative statement with regard to the defect and not for a mere failure to disclose. See Mc
Donald v. Christie, 42 Barb. 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863). Thus, as with contracts, this form of
tort liability required a strong volitional act by the defendant. Mere inaction would not
suffice.
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was not seen as inconsistent with the individualist, pro-market
sympathies of conservative ideology.
Second, tort law was entirely reconceptualized so as to base
liability on volition. 8 Tort law, which in the early nineteenth century was heavily dominated by strict liability, to the conservatives
was a disfavored basis of liability. In contrast to contract, where
liability was consensual, liability in tort could be imposed on an
individual whose only volitional act was a voluntary muscular contraction, with no inkling that his act could result in liability.
As a reflection of the new emphasis on volition-based liability,
a number of torts, such as assault, battery, and trespass, which had
been based on strict liability prior to the late nineteenth century,
suddenly were reconceived as intentional torts.' The state no
longer would intervene to redistribute property from the defendant
to the plaintiff merely on a showing that the defendant had injured
the plaintiff. It was now necessary to show that the defendant had
intended injury to the plaintiff.
Negligence, which prior to the mid-nineteenth century had
meant a failure to perform a duty imposed by law, in effect a form
of strict liability, was reconceived as a failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of harm. 10 As in the case of the
emergence of intentional torts, the state no longer would intervene
to redistribute property from the defendant to the plaintiff upon a
showing that the defendant had injured the plaintiff. It now was
necessary to show that the defendant had acted unreasonably in
the face of a foreseeable risk of harm and thus had acted with a
greater degree of volition than had been required under strict
liability."'
Tort liability generally was not imposed unless the defendant
had in some sense willed his liability, by acting either with the intent to harm or with the foreknowledge that harm might occur.
Strict liability, which had dominated tort law prior to the late
nineteenth century, became a largely residual category of liability,
12
reserved for activities such as the keeping of dangerous animals.
" See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General
Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 457-70 (1990).
9 Id. at 450-54, 457-65.
10 MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 85-89
(1977); WHITE, supra note 4, at 15.
'1 See Vandevelde, supra note 8, at 470-71.
12 See WHITE, supra note 4, at 108. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 76, at 538-43 (5th ed. 1984).

IDEOLOGY

19931

Third, tort liability, where it did exist, often was undercut by
contract principles. That is, tort liability could be limited by con13
sensual conduct. For example, the doctrine of assumption of risk
and the fellow servant rule 14 exonerated an employer from liability
for injury to his employees on the theory that the employee had
consented to the risk of injury by accepting employment. Since
private activity was presumed to be free, it was not difficult to portray the acceptance of employment with certain knowable risks as
an essentially consensual act.
These various tort and contract rules were directed at effectively subordinating the judicial machinery to private will; that is,
liability arose from volitional conduct by the parties. The court's
function was to identify the liabilities that the parties had in some
sense willed and then to enforce those liabilities.
b. Public Law: Curbing Regulatory Power
In public law, conservative courts sought to protect the primacy of the market by curbing regulatory legislation enacted by
populist or progressive legislatures. Beginning in 1873 with the dissents of Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases,'1 5 the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of

substantive due process, under which the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were held to prohibit legislation that unreasonably interfered with property or the liberty to
contract. In a period reaching roughly from the Court's 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 6 to its 1937 decision in West Coast
7 and generally known as the Lochner era,' the
Hotel v. Parrish"
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of substantive due process to
invalidate nearly two hundred federal or state statutes. 9
Substantive due process doctrine required that the courts develop a definition of the liberty or property rights protected
against unreasonable interference. For this, they looked to the
13

See, e.g., WHrrE, supra note 4, at 41-45.

11 WHrrE, supra note 4, at 51-55.

It 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
16 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
27 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
18 So named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19See LAURENCE H. TRME, AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW § 8-2, at 567 n.2 (2d ed.
1988) (identifying 197 state and federal regulatory statutes invalidated by Court between
1899 and 1937). As Professor Tribe points out, an even larger number of statutes survived
the Court's scrutiny during this period. Id.
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common law; that is, the common law provided content to the substantive due process doctrine. The result was a constitutionalization of the common law.20
Like the shifts in common-law doctrine described above, the
Lochner era decisions reflected the belief that private choices
made through the market should be given effect. Neither the common law nor legislative enactments should be permitted to interfere with an intent-based system of liability. Contract was the preferred method of redistribution, and legislation that interfered
with the scope of contract was void.
Late nineteenth century conservative ideology preferred a
court with limited power over the property of individuals, but
great power over the legislature. In their dealings with private individuals, courts should be mere facilitators of private choice, not
regulators, a role which called for judicial restraint. In their dealings with legislatures, courts should be the vigilant protectors of
the prerogative of private choice against regulatory legislation, a
role which called for judicial activism.
2.

The Jurisprudential Dimension: Formalism

Late nineteenth century conservative ideology had a jurisprudential dimension as well. The jurisprudential dimension conceptualized the law ideally as a system of formal, abstract rules which
could be derived from precedent or statute and applied mechanically to decide particular cases-an approach now generally called
formalism. Because judging was the mechanical application of
known, prior decisions, such a system promised the high degree of
predictability necessary for a market to function properly.
The formalists of the late nineteenth century preferred broad,
general rules which would govern large categories of cases. Thus,
for example, there should be a single law of contract, applicable to
all contractual relationships, rather than distinct bodies of law applicable to commercial contracts, labor contracts, consumer contracts, and so forth.2
20

Id. at 562-64.

2 The formalist belief that the law can be distilled to a few general rules which can be

applied mechanically to decide cases was captured in Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's preface to his 1871 casebook on contract law, in which he wrote:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
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The underlying premise again was that all persons were free
and equal, and thus their conduct should be evaluated by the same
rules. Free will and equal bargaining power, of course, also are
premises that underlie market economics. Thus, the basic assumptions of formalism reinforced the basic assumptions that supported
judicial deference to market-based decision-making.
The effect of these broad, general rules was to place human
conduct into various large, but sharply-drawn categories. The category into which conduct fell determined the legal consequences of
that conduct. The sense that the categories were well-defined contributed to the belief that adjudication could be a mechanical
process.
Property rights, for example, were sharply distinguished from
personal rights. Property rights were rights over things, while personal rights were rights against other persons.2 2 Property rights
were to be protected absolutely against infringement, and thus, the
simple determination that a right was over a thing led mechanically to the conclusion that it was to be protected absolutely2 3
B.

Civil Procedure

Late nineteenth century conservatism was reflected not only
in substantive law, but in civil procedure as well. The Supreme
Court constructed a modern law of personal jurisdiction around
the two basic principles of conservative private and public law
doctrine.
Borrowing from private law doctrine, the Supreme Court took
the principle that jurisdiction, like liability, should be based on
the volitional conduct of the defendant. From public law doctrine,
the Supreme Court took the principle that the Due Process Clause
limits state regulatory power. These principles reconceptualized
lawyer ....
Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less
than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same doctrine
is constantly making its appearance... being the cause of much apprehension. If
these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in
its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their
number.
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (1871).
22 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property,29 BUFF. L. REv. 325, 331-32 (1980). The

sharp distinction was reflected, for example, in the rule that equity would act to protect
property rights, but not personal rights. Id. at 334.
23 Id. at 328-30.
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the law of personal jurisdiction.
The law of personal jurisdiction formulated by the Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth century also reflected the jurisprudential dimension of the conservative ideology of that era. As will be
seen, the law of personal jurisdiction was a structure of rigid categories and formal, abstract rules.
Thus, from the beginning, conservative jurisdictional doctrine
had three essential elements: (1) the requirement of volitional conduct; (2) the use of the Due Process Clause to limit power; and (3)
a formalist system of rigid rules.
The pivotal case in the construction of a conservative law of
personal jurisdiction was Pennoyer v. Neff, 24 in which the Supreme
Court declared that the Due Process Clause imposed territorial
limitations on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. In Pennoyer, an attorney named John Mitchell had filed suit in Oregon
against his former client Marcus Neff for an unpaid fee of less than
$300.25 At the time the suit was filed, Neff was not a resident of
Oregon, and he was never personally served with process. 26 Mitchell won a default judgment, which was satisfied by an execution
against certain land owned by Neff.27 As a result of the execution
and sale of the land, title was acquired by Sylvester Pennoyer.
When Neff returned to Oregon, he filed an action against Pennoyer
to recover possession. 8
The case turned on the question whether the judgment against
Neff was valid. The Supreme Court held in an opinion by Justice
Stephen Field that the judgment was not valid.29
The Court's discussion articulated a fundamental distinction
between two types of personal jurisdiction: in rem and in personam jurisdiction. In an in rem (or quasi in rem) action, the court
essentially exercises jurisdiction over property located in the territory of the sovereign, whereas in an in personam action the court
exercises jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.3 0
A court obtains in rem jurisdiction by issuing an order attach'4

95 U.S. 714 (1877).

25

Id. at 719.

26 Id. at 719-20.
27
28

29

Id. at 719.
Id.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.

30 Id. at 724-26. The Court used the term in rem to refer collectively to in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction.
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ing the property. 1 In Pennoyer, however, the action against Neff
had been brought before he obtained title to the land, and thus,
the land had not been attached prior 32to judgment. For that reason,
the court had no jurisdiction in rem.
Turning to in personam jurisdiction, the Court explained that
international law traditionally refused to recognize the validity of a
judgment rendered in one state against a citizen of another when
the defendant had not been served with process or voluntarily appeared. 3 Thus, under international law, a court had jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant only if the defendant was a resident of the state, consented to jurisdiction, or was served personally while in the territory of the state. Since none of these conditions had been met, the Oregon court had no jurisdiction over
Neff, and accordingly the judgment against him was void.3
That analysis alone could have decided the case. The Court
went further, however, and held that the exercise of jurisdiction
over a defendant except in accordance with these traditional principles would violate the Due Process Clause.35 The Due Process
Clause, in other words, limited the power of courts to intervene in
private affairs and redistribute wealth from the defendant to the
plaintiff.
The entire discussion of the Due Process Clause technically
was dictum. The Fourteenth Amendment had not been ratified at
the time the trial court assumed jurisdiction over Neff and thus
could not have imposed any limitations on the court's exercise of
power.
Justice Field's use of the Due Process Clause, however, constructed a law of personal jurisdiction that was structurally parallel
to the substantive due process doctrine, that he had begun to introduce into American public law only four years before in the
Slaughter-House Cases3 6 In Justice Field's law of personal jurisdiction, as in his public law, the Due Process Clause was a primary
source of limitations on state power to regulate private economic
activity. Further, just as he would do in the area of substantive due
process, Justice Field in the area of personal jurisdiction looked to
31 Id. at 727-28.
11 Id. at 728.
13 Id. at 729.
1 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-34.
" Id.
at 733.
26 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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the common law to provide the content of the limitations imposed
on state power by the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the limitation on judicial power imposed by the Due
Process Clause under Pennoyer was consistent with the basic principle of conservative private law doctrine. Specifically, power could
be exercised only in three situations, all of which were within the
control of the defendant: where the defendant had become a citizen of the jurisdiction, had appeared physically in the jurisdiction
at the time of service, or had consented to jurisdiction. Since all
three situations involved volitional conduct by the defendant, the
defendant would be subject to judicial power only if he allowed
himself to be. Jurisdiction, in other words, was based on the volitional conduct of the defendant. The power of the courts, in effect,
was subordinate to the will of the defendant.
Neff had been served by publication in accordance with state
law.37 This was insufficient, however, to confer jurisdiction. Pennoyer thus imposed due process limitations on the power of the
legislature as well. No legislature could authorize the courts to exercise power over individuals except in accordance with the volition-based theories of jurisdiction-citizenship, presence, or
consent.
The law of personal jurisdiction developed by late nineteenth
century conservatives merged elements drawn from conservative
doctrine in both public and private law. Personal jurisdiction doctrine took from public law its essential structure: the use of the
Due Process Clause to limit the exercise of state power. Personal
jurisdiction doctrine took from private law its essential content:
the exercise of state power only where the defendant had engaged
in some form of volitional conduct. Thus, state power was subordinated to private will.38
The law of personal jurisdiction articulated in Pennoyer also
was consistent with the formalist ideology of late nineteenth century conservatives. The sharp distinction between in rem and in
personam jurisdidtion mirrored the sharp distinction between
property and personal rights. It reflected the formalist preference
for rigid categories into which events could be placed, thereby determining their legal consequences.
37 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
38

See Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57

GEo. WASH. L. REV. 849, 894 (1989) (arguing that principle of consent "unites and justifies"
the bases of jurisdiction approved by Pennoyer as well as International Shoe).
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The formalist preference for abstract, general rules was reflected in the rules governing in rem and in personam jurisdiction.
In rem jurisdiction was based on presence of property in the territory, while in personam jurisdiction was based on presence, residence, or consent. Neither rule seemed to require detailed, factspecific determinations. Both rules were stated at a high level of
generality and seemed to determine large numbers of cases in a
relatively mechanical way.
II.

A.

MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY LIBERAL IDEOLOGY

Substantive Law

The liberal ideology of the mid-twentieth century developed to
a very great extent as a reaction against late nineteenth century
conservatism. 9 Conservatism, of course, never commanded universal acceptance on the part of American courts or lawyers. Even at
its most potent moment, there were dissenting voices challenging
both the political and the jurisprudential dimensions of conservative ideology. For example, the doctrine of substantive due process
did not command a majority of the Court until the turn of the
century, more than twenty years after the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases.40 The most famous of the substantive due process cases, Lochner v. New York, 41 was also the occasion for one of
the best known critiques of substantive due process-Justice
Holmes' dissent in that same case.42
1. The Political Dimension: Market Regulation
In the political dimension of ideology, mid-twentieth century
liberalism disputed the conservative assumption that the principal
threat to individual economic freedom was government intervention in private affairs. Liberals did not regard all individuals as
free and equal in their relations with each other. Rather, they be-

" The following discussion of liberal ideology draws on the following works, although
the authors may or may not agree with my synthesis: GiLMoRE, supra note 4; EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

(1973); WHITE, supra note 4; Kennedy, supra

note 4; Mensch, supra note 4; G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change in Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999
(1972).
10 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
4' 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42 Id. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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lieved that civil society was characterized by hierarchies based on
wealth which permitted some individuals to dominate others. Private domination rather than government tyranny was the more immediate threat to freedom.
The protection of individual rights, therefore, necessitated
government regulation of private economic activity to protect the
weak from the strong. The courts and legislature should not reflexively defer to the market, but should scrutinize and regulate market-based decisions to ensure that individuals were adequately
protected against exploitation.
These political tenets of mid-twentieth century liberal ideology transformed both private law and public law. As will be seen,
courts modified the common law as well as constitutional law in
ways which permitted greater government regulation of private economic activity.
a. Private Law: De-emphasizing Volition
In private law, courts moved away from the principle that liability should be based on the volitional conduct of the defendant.
Each of the trends in contract and tort law which had characterized late nineteenth century private law was reversed to some extent in the mid-twentieth century.
First, some forms of liability were moved from the realm of
contract to the realm of tort. Beginning with MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,43 for example, courts held that a consumer could sue a

manufacturer for negligence, even though they were not in privity
of contract. Put another way, products liability could arise in tort
as well as contract. Similarly, courts began to impose tort liability
for intentional interference with prospective advantage 4 and thus
to protect expectancies under the rubric of tort in addition to that
of contract. Contract law, in other words, no longer was the preferred mode of judicial intervention in private affairs. Courts increasingly addressed problems of liability for injury from the more
paternalistic and regulatory perspective of tort law.
Second, within tort law, the courts resurrected strict liability.
Beginning with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.," courts
"' 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 1005-12 (§ 130 - Interference with Prospective

44

Advantage).
4" 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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held sellers strictly liable to persons injured by defects in their
products. Courts also began to impose strict liability on those who
caused physical injury by engaging in abnormally dangerous activities.4 6 Although each of these theories of liability applied only
where an injury was caused by the defendant's volitional act, the
level of intent was attenuated and remote in time from the injury.
All that was necessary for liability was for the defendant to have
voluntarily sold the product or engaged in the abnormally dangerous activity.
Third, courts were less willing to permit parties to subordinate
tort duties to contract. Courts began, for example, to limit the assumption of risk doctrine as well as the fellow servant rule.47 Because courts now were more conscious of hierarchy and domination
in the private sphere, they were unwilling to characterize the decision to accept hazardous employment as a voluntary contract between employer and employee.
Indeed, in a stark reversal of the trend which had transformed
private law in the nineteenth century, tort law began to infiltrate
the realm of contract. Courts interjected tort-like doctrines based
on public policy or fairness, such as promissory estoppel, into contract law. 48 The "contractualization" of tort law, which had characterized the nineteenth century, gave way to the "tortification" of
contract law in the mid-twentieth century.
Private law rules now were shaped by the state's regulatory
interests, which might require the imposition of liability despite
the fact that the defendant had acted with only the most attenuated form of volition. This shift was reflected not only in the contract and tort rules discussed above, but in property law as well.
By the early twentieth century, courts and commentators had begun to acknowledge that property rights were not rooted in any
kind of individualist conception of natural law, but were creations
of a positive, regulatory state.4 9
The judicial machinery was no longer so readily subordinated
46 See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931) (ex-

plaining abnormally dangerous activities doctrine and policy); Pacific Northwest Bell Tel.
Co. v. Port of Seattle, 491 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Wash. 1971) (explaining strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities).
" See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 493-95, 571-72 (§ 68 - Assumption of
Risk and Employers' Liability).
41 See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (tracing separation of
contract law from tort law and subsequent reabsorption).
40 See Vandevelde, supra note 22, at 363-66.
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to private will. The state would not defer instinctively to marketbased arrangements, but would scrutinize and regulate private economic activity.
b.

Public Law: Deference to Economic Regulation

In public law, liberal ideology called for judicial restraint in
reviewing the constitutionality of economic regulation enacted by
the legislature. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,50 decided in 1937,
the Supreme Court upheld minimum wage legislation, explicitly
overruling a prior Lochner era decision."1 Other major Lochner era
decisions were overruled during the next few years. 2 Finally, in
1955 the Supreme Court held, in Williamson v. Lee Optical
Corp.,5" that economic regulation would be upheld based on mere
supposition about what the legislature might have believed was the
rationale for the legislation. By this time, the Supreme Court's deference to legislative judgment in the area of economic regulation
was almost total.
Like the changes in common-law doctrine described above, the
post-Lochner era decisions reflected the belief that the market
needed regulation. Neither the common law nor legislative enactments should be subordinated to private will, nor should the courts
defer to a volition-based system of liability. The courts would, and
the legislatures could, intervene in private contractual arrangements to allocate liability as public policy or fairness required.
Thus, in the area of economic regulation, mid-twentieth century liberal ideology preferred a court that would itself aggressively
regulate private economic activity, while also deferring to legislative economic regulations. In their dealings with private individuals, courts should be regulators, not deferential ratifiers, of private
choice-a role which called for judicial activism. In their dealings
with the legislature on economic matters, courts should defer to
legislative judgment-a role which called for judicial restraint.
As the twentieth century reached its third decade, the Supreme Court began to hear more cases involving challenges to state
regulation of speech, particularly in the form of prohibitions on the
o 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 400; Adkins v. Children's Hasp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast

81

Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
5'2 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-83 (1941) (referring to Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)).
53 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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advocacy of lawless action. In those cases, prominent liberals on
the Court, particularly Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis
Brandeis, made it clear that their deference to legislative regulation did not extend beyond the area of economic regulation. Consequently, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented from Supreme
Court decisions upholding the conviction of communists and socialists under various espionage, criminal anarchy, and criminal
syndicalism statutes.5
Liberal ideology did not perceive speech as an area in which
private domination was to be feared. Indeed, at the very time that
liberals were calling for increased regulation of the market, Justice
Holmes was defending "free trade in ideas" on the theory that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." 55 Individual freedom
required regulation of the economic market, but unregulated commerce in the marketplace of ideas.
Liberal support for protecting individual rights against state
regulation extended beyond free speech. In 1938, only a year after
the Supreme Court ended the Lochner era, Chief Justice Harlan
Stone laid a cornerstone of mid-twentieth century liberal ideology.
He suggested in United States v. Carolene Products Co.56 that,
while the court normally should defer to legislative judgments, legislation affecting certain noneconomic rights, particularly those
specifically protected by the Bill of Rights, might be "subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny.

' 57

Thus, the Court strictly scruti-

nized legislative restrictions on noneconomic rights such as free
speech 58 and privacy.59 Liberals deferred to legislative regulation of
economic rights, but opposed legislative restrictions on many
noneconomic rights.60
5 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253-73 (1920) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting). Justices Holmes and Brandeis did not always dissent. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., concurring), overruled by Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919).
11 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
'"Id.
at 152-53 n.4.
58 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) ("[A] law directed at speech
itself, [must] be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment
requires.").
59 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
60 See generally TRnE,supra note 19, at 769-72.
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2. The Jurisprudential Dimension: Realism
Liberal ideology also rejected the jurisprudential dimension of
late nineteenth century conservatism. Liberals, now led by a movement known as Legal Realism, 61 did not believe that rules could be
mechanically applied to particular facts to yield a single, inevitable
result. Rather, cases could be decided only by reference to underlying policies. That is, the decision in a particular case represented a
choice by the court among competing policies, not the neutral application of a rule.
Similarly, liberals rejected the scheme of rigid categories that
had typified late nineteenth century conservative jurisprudence.
The mid-twentieth century witnessed, for example, the collapse of
the distinction between property rights and personal rights.6 2 This
collapse resulted from the realization that property rights were not
rights over things, but rights against other persons. This realization culminated with the work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, who
had argued that any given instance of property could be characterized as consisting of one or more "jural relations" between persons-such as a right, privilege, power, or immunity.6 Such terms,
of course, were equally applicable to jural relations between persons not involving any kind of thing. Any right could be characterized either as a property right or as a personal right.
Liberal skepticism about rules was reinforced by a recognition
of inequality and domination in the private sector. Liberals believed that inequalities in bargaining power rendered it unfair to
apply the same rules in the same way to large numbers of relationships. For example, consumer contracts might be governed by rules
different than those which applied to contracts between
merchants.6 4
The greatly reduced importance of volitional conduct as a ba01

See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.

REV. 431, 438-54 (1930).
62 See Vandevelde, supra note 22, at 357-66.
'3 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-32 (1913).
64 The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, which was drafted by Karl Llewellyn,

among the best known of the Legal Realists, distinguished between contracts between
merchants and other contracts. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1990) (separate statute of frauds
for contracts between merchants); § 2-205 (special provision for firm offers by merchants); §
2-209(2) (special provision for contract modifications between merchants); § 2-314 (implied
warranty of merchantability in sales by merchants).
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sis for liability in liberal ideology was consistent with the liberals'
view that many bargaining relationships were characterized by varying degrees of hierarchy. To the extent that free will is compromised by those with greater bargaining power, the use of volitional
conduct as the principal basis of liability made little sense. Doubts
about the voluntariness of contractual relationships reinforced the
liberals' reluctance to defer to the market as a mechanism for decision-making.
Because of their skepticism about the possibility or the fairness of mechanically applying broad, general rules, liberals often
preferred that legal principles be embodied in flexible standards,
such as "reasonableness" or "good faith." 5 These relatively vague
standards would permit a court to decide cases in a way that took
into account the relative position of the parties and furthered the
regulatory goals of the state.
B. Civil Procedure
Just as late nineteenth century conservatism had reconceptualized the rules of jurisdiction in Pennoyer to parallel rules of liability, mid-twentieth century liberalism transformed the Pennoyer
doctrine to mirror mid-twentieth century changes in substantive
law. Liberals borrowed from both public and private law doctrine
to create a liberal doctrine of personal jurisdiction.
Borrowing from private law, liberals adopted the principle
that jurisdiction, like liability, should be based on the regulatory
needs of the state. From public law, liberals took the principle that
the Due Process Clause imposes only a very weak restraint on state
regulatory power.
The liberal personal jurisdiction doctrine of the mid-twentieth
century also reflected the jurisprudential dimension of the liberal
ideology of that era. Liberals abandoned the rigid categories of formalism in favor of a more flexible standard which created jurisdiction where to do so was fair and reasonable under the
11

These terms, for example, are important concepts in Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Com-

mercial Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (obligations of good faith and reasonableness prescribed by Code may not be disclaimed, although parties may determine by agreement standards by which performance of such obligations is to be measured if standards are not
manifestly unreasonable); § 1-201(19) (defining "good faith"); § 1-203 (imposing obligation
of good faith in contracts); § 2-306(1) (terms of output and requirements contracts set by
standards of good faith and reasonableness); § 2-309 (allowing reasonable time for
performance).
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circumstances.
From the beginning, the liberal doctrine of personal jurisdiction had three elements: (1) jurisdiction based on the state's regulatory interests, with little or no volitional conduct required; (2)
the expansion of state court personal jurisdiction by weakening the
limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause; and (3) the use of
flexible standards. Thus, all three tenets of the conservative doctrine of personal jurisdiction were in some measure rejected.
1. InternationalShoe
The liberal transformation of personal jurisdiction doctrine
began with International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 decided in
1945. The State of Washington instituted an action against the International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation, to collect unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation
fund." International Shoe had no corporate offices in Washington,
but did employ salesmen to solicit and take orders within the
state." Service was made upon one such salesman. 9
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the state
court had personal jurisdiction over International Shoe. Because
International Shoe was a Delaware corporation, residence did not
provide a basis. The Court might have concluded, as it had in
other situations,° that International Shoe's activities were sufficient to constitute presence within the state and that jurisdiction
was thus consistent with the Pennoyer triad.
The Court chose instead to reconceptualize the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts. The Court held that the Due Process Clause required
only that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"" The
Court noted that the criteria for determining whether the test was
06

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

e Id. at 311.
6 Id. at 313.
69 Id. at 312.
70 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914); St. Louis
S.W.R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 247-48 (1913).
71 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
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met "cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. ' 2
International Shoe represented both a jurisprudential and a
political transformation of the Due Process Clause as it applied to
personal jurisdiction. The jurisprudential transformation is the
more obvious: Consistent with liberalism's proclivity to use standards in place of rules, the Court in International Shoe moved
from the rigid Pennoyer rule to a more flexible minimum contacts
standard. 3 InternationalShoe was a rejection of formalism in the
law of personal jurisdiction.
The political transformation had two elements, each of which
reversed one of the accomplishments of Pennoyer. First, whereas
Pennoyer had established the Due Process Clause as a limitation
on jurisdiction,7 4 International Shoe weakened the Due Process
Clause by permitting the exercise of jurisdiction where none of the
Pennoyer-approved bases existed.7 5 The weakening of the Due
Process Clause as a restriction on jurisdiction in International
Shoe paralleled the weakening of the Due Process Clause as a restriction on substantive legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish.6
Second, whereas Pennoyer had based constitutionally proper
jurisdiction on the defendant's volitional conduct, International
Shoe based jurisdiction on "contacts," without necessarily requiring contacts that were volitional on the defendant's part. All that
was necessary was that jurisdiction be fair and just in light of the
contacts. InternationalShoe thus moved away from Pennoyer by
suggesting the possibility of jurisdiction based on something other
72Id. at 319.
7'The shift from Pennoyer to InternationalShoe was not effected in a single step. As

noted above, decades before InternationalShoe was decided, courts had begun to find that
nonresident corporations had a kind of fictitious presence in the forum state as a result of
their activities in the state. Similarly, the courts also had upheld state statutes which conferred personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on the fiction that the nonresident had
impliedly consented to jurisdiction by engaging in certain specified conduct, such as driving
an automobile in the forum state. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 578-82 (1958).
Thus, the abandonment of the rigid Pennoyer rule had occurred in two stages. The first
was to retain the rule in form, but to interpret presence and consent very broadly. The
second was to hold in InternationalShoe that adherence to the Pennoyer rule, even in
form, no longer was necessary, and that satisfaction of the more flexible standard of minimum contacts would suffice. See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
71Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
75InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
76 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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than a volitional act by the defendant, without explicitly approving
such an exercise of jurisdiction. The apparent de-emphasis on the
defendant's volition as a basis for jurisdiction in International
Shoe paralleled the de-emphasis on volition as a basis for liability
in mid-twentieth century private law.
Both of these elements of the political transformation were reaffirmed five years later in the first two Supreme Court cases to
apply the InternationalShoe doctrine. The extent to which International Shoe had unleashed state jurisdictional power by weakening the Due Process Clause was demonstrated by Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia,7 while the diminished importance of the defendant's volitional conduct was shown by Mullane v. Central Hanover
78
Bank & Trust Co.
In Travelers Health, the defendant was a membership association incorporated in Nebraska which conducted a mail order
health insurance business in Virginia, the forum state."9 Unlike the
International Shoe Company, it had no paid agents.8 0 Rather, its
new members generally were obtained through recommendations
from existing members. 8 1 Once a prospect was identified, he was
sent a blank application form which was to be filled out and re82
turned to the home office in Omaha.
In resisting the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts, Travelers
cited a pre-International Shoe decision, Minnesota Commercial
Men's Ass'n v. Benn,8 3 in which the Supreme Court had held that
a Minnesota association, which obtained members in Montana by
the same mail solicitation process as used by Travelers to obtain
Virginia members, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts. The Minnesota association's activities in Montana
simply were not sufficient to support the fiction that it met the
84
consent or presence criteria of Pennoyer
The Court held, however, that Travelers was subject to the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts.85 It rejected the "narrow grounds"
"" 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
78 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
79 Travelers, 339 U.S. at 645-46.
80 Id. at 646.
81 Id.
82

Id.

261 U.S. 140 (1923).
Travelers, 339 U.S. at 647.
11 Id. at 649.

83
84
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of the Benn case as no longer controlling 8 and concluded that the
minimum contacts standard of International Shoe was met. The
clear message was that the minimum contacts standard would permit state courts to exercise power over defendants who had been
beyond the reach of courts under the Pennoyer rule. The Court
had effectively weakened the Due Process Clause as a limitation on
state court jurisdiction.
Mullane was an action filed in New York state court by the
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company to obtain a judicial
settlement of accounts with respect to a common trust fund it was
administering as trustee.8s The decree sought would have the effect
of conclusively extinguishing claims that the beneficiaries might
have had against Central Hanover growing out of the latter's management of the fund. 8 Some of the beneficiaries clearly were not
residents of the State of New York. 9 Other beneficiaries could not
even be identified by name. The court appointed Mullane as
guardian and attorney for "all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in
the income of the common trust fund."'" Mullane objected that the
court had no personal jurisdiction over those beneficiaries who
92
were nonresidents of New York.
The Supreme Court held that New York did have jurisdiction
over all beneficiaries.9 3 It explained that "the interest of each state
in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its
laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so
insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the
right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident.

'94

Not a word was said about the conduct of the beneficiaries.
Jurisdiction was not based on any form of volitional conduct by
the beneficiaries-indeed, some beneficiaries were not as yet even
identified. Rather, jurisdiction existed because of the state's inter86 Id. at 647.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307-09.
I' Id. at 311.
89 Id. at 309.
11 Id. at 317.
91 Id. at 310.
92 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311. Mullane also argued that some beneficiaries had been
17

given inadequate notice, a contention with which the Court agreed in part. Id. at 311-19.
03 Id. at 313.
94 Id.
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est in regulating trusts created under its laws.9 5
2. The Early Struggle for the Soul of InternationalShoe
a. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.
The liberal transformation of personal jurisdiction reached its
apotheosis in 1957 with the Supreme Court's decision in McGee v.
InternationalLife Insurance Co."' In McGee, the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy filed suit in California state court against a
nonresident insurance company for payment of insurance proceeds.97 The defendant had no office or agent in California and,
insofar as the record showed, had never solicited or condticted any
insurance business in California apart from the single policy involved in the case.9 8 The defendant had issued that single policy
only as a result of an agreement with another insurance company
to take over the latter's obligations.9 9 Following the agreement, the
defendant had offered to cover the insured in accordance with the
terms of the original policy, an offer which the insured accepted. 10 0
Although the only contact between the defendant and California
was the single insurance policy, the Court upheld California's juris10 1
diction over the defendant.
The Court's opinion in McGee, written by Justice Black and
announced by Justice Douglas, for the first time openly acknowledged that there had been a "clearly discernable [trend] toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents. ' 01 - The Court, also for the
first time, supplied the underlying reason for this trend. "In part,
[it was] attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years."10 3 That is, many commercial trans96 Id. Because the action involved land situated in the forum, Mullane apparently ar-

gued that the case was governed by Pennoyer. Id. at 311. The Court, however, rejected this
argument as well. After observing that the action resembled, in different ways, both in rem
and in personam actions, the Court stated that Fourteenth Amendment standards would
not turn on the "technical definition" of the action under state law. Id.
-6 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
97 Id. at 221-22.
98 Id. at 222.
99 Id. at 221-22.
100 Id.
101 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
102

Id. at 222.

103

Id.
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actions now touched more than one state and involved parties on
opposite coasts. "At the same time," the Court continued, "modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he
10 4
engages in economic activity. M

McGee thus reaffirmed both of the elements of the political
dimension to the liberal transformation of the Due Process Clause
in personal jurisdiction cases. First, the Court acknowledged that it
was very consciously expanding the jurisdiction of the courts over
nonresidents engaged in economic activity. Second, the expansion
was giving rise to new jurisdictional rules limited only by the scope
of the state's regulatory interests and not by the scope of the defendant's volitional conduct. As the Court explained, "It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims.

' 10 5

That is, the expansion of power was directly tied to the

role of the state in regulating market activity to protect consumers.
b. Hanson v. Denckla
The very same term, however, the Court handed down a decision in Hanson v. Denckla,106 which planted the seeds for a resurgence of conservative ideology in the area of personal jurisdiction.
Thus began a struggle for the soul of InternationalShoe which has
continued to the present.
In Hanson, a trust had been established in Delaware by a
Pennsylvania settlor who later changed her domicile to Florida.1 07
Upon the settlor's death, a dispute arose as to whether the property passed to the legatees under the settlor's will or to the beneficiaries of an inter vivos power of appointment exercised by the settlor.108 Some of the legatees brought an action for a declaratory
judgment in Florida, naming as defendants the beneficiaries of the
appointment and the Delaware trustee.10 9 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether the Florida courts had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.110
104

Id. at 223.

20 Id.
106 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1o"Id. at 238-39.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 240-41.
110 Id. at 243.
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For the first time since InternationalShoe, the Court found,
in a 5-4 decision, that a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction had
violated the Due Process Clause.11' Chief Justice Warren's opinion
for the majority challenged each of the three elements of the liberal transformation of the Due Process Clause.
First, the majority challenged the great expansion of personal
jurisdiction that had followed on the heels of InternationalShoe.
Chief Justice Warren began his analysis by paraphrasing the language in McGee that had noted the trend of expanding personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents." 2 "But," the Chief Justice wrote as
he drew the line in the dust, "it is a mistake to assume that this
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.""'
Second, the majority sought to reformulate due process doctrine so as to base jurisdiction on the defendant's volitional conduct rather than on the state's regulatory interests. The Chief Justice announced a new test which must be satisfied for the
InternationalShoe standard to be met: "[I]t is essential in each
case," he wrote, "that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
14

of its laws.""1

The new test required a purposeful availment of the forum
state's laws by the defendant. Thus, "unilateral activity" by those
"who claim some relationship" with the defendant could not satisfy the requirements of InternationalShoe." 5 Only the defendant's own purposeful affiliation with the state could subject it to
the power of the state's courts.
The purposeful availment test not only reintroduced the defendant's volitional conduct as the basis of jurisdiction, but also
provided a mechanism for preventing the continued expansion of
personal jurisdiction. Applying the purposeful availment rule to
the facts, the Court found no jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee. 116
Third, the majority attempted to recast due process doctrine
"

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.

112 Id. at 250-51.

113 Id. at 251.
114

Id. at 253.

215 Id.
118 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
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more in the form of a rule than a standard. Chief Justice Warren
noted that there had been a jurisprudential shift "from the rigid
rule 11of7 Pennoyer... to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe
Co.

The test which the majority now adopted represented a

move back in the direction of the rigid rule of Pennoyer. Purwithout it,
poseful availment became "essential in each case";
the InternationalShoe test could not be satisfied.
The four liberal dissenters staunchly defended all three elements of the liberal transformation of personal jurisdiction that
had marked the line of cases from InternationalShoe to McGee.
Their defense was set forth in a dissenting opinion by Justice
Black, who had written for the Court in McGee and now was
joined by Justices Brennan and Burton,1 9 and in a separate dissent by Justice Douglas. 2 0
First, they defended the expansion of personal jurisdiction beyond the limits set by Pennoyer. Indeed, Justice Black argued that
"further relaxation [of due process limits on personal jurisdiction]
seems certain."' 21 The dissenters favored the expansion of personal
jurisdiction and believed that it would continue.
Second, the dissenters favored a due process doctrine under
which jurisdiction was based, not on the defendant's volitional conduct, but on the state's regulatory interest, subject to some general
standard of fairness. Both dissents relied on Mullane, which had
based jurisdiction on the state's interest in regulating a trust fund.
Justice Douglas posed the test as simply "whether the procedure is fair and just, considering the interests of the parties."''

22

He

noted Florida's "plain and compelling relation" to the disputed
property, the closeness of the nexus between the settlor and the
trustee, and the fact that the action would not result in the imposition of liability on the trustee. 2 '
Justices Black, Brennan, and Burton would have found jurisdiction to exist because the litigation arose from a transaction that
had "an abundance of close and substantial connections" with the
forum state. 24 Once the close and substantial connection between
117Id. at 251.
118 Id.
at 253.
119 Id. at 256-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 262-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1"1 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 260 (Black, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 263 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123 Id.
124 Id.

at 260 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the litigation and the forum state was established, the forum state
should have jurisdiction unless litigating there "would impose such
a heavy and disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant
that it would offend

. .

. 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-

stantial justice.' "1125 No such unfairness was present here. Florida,
as the domicile of most of the principal claimants, was a "reasonably convenient forum" for the litigants. 12 6 Justice Black analogized

the facts in Hanson to those in Mullane, noting that Florida had
an interest in the litigation because
it involved a will that was be1 27
ing administered in that state.

The dissenters spoke scarcely at all of the need for purposeful
conduct by the defendant. Justice Black did observe that the exercise of jurisdiction over the trustee was not unfair because it
"chose to maintain business relations" with the settlor for eight
years, "regularly communicating" with her concerning the business
of the trust.128 The fact of this intentional conduct was considered
in applying the fairness test. Neither dissent, however, suggested
that purposeful conduct by the defendant was "essential in every
1 29
case."
Third, the dissenters insisted that the InternationalShoe test
should continue to be cast in terms of a flexible standard, generally
fairness or justice under the circumstances. 30 They refused to
identify any single factor, such as purposeful conduct, as
dispositive.
III.

THE RESURGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

Hanson had planted the seeds of a conservative resurgence,
but they were a long time in sprouting. Most commentators dismissed Hanson as an aberrational case, and courts continued to
follow the liberal philosophy of McGee. 131 The period from 1945 to
1977 witnessed an "unparalleled expansion" of state judicial juris2I Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting).

126

11"Id. at 260-61.
128
129

Id. at 259.
Id.

110 Id. at 258-59, 263 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131 See Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuck, 58 N.C.
L. REV. 407, 423 (1980); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice
Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 AUz. ST. L.J. 585, 595.
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diction 132 as mid-twentieth century liberalism achieved a position
of dominance in American law. The Supreme Court, after Hanson,
fell silent on the topic. From 1958 until 1977, the Court decided no
cases involving the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause on
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
By 1977, the composition of the Supreme Court had changed
considerably. Of the four liberal dissenters in Hanson, only Justice
Brennan remained. The liberal wing of the Court was reduced to
two-Justices Brennan and Marshall. A conservative bloc, consisting of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell,
had arisen on the right, with Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Stewart,
and White holding a centrist position. The stage was set for a resurgence of conservative ideology.
The Court now began to seize opportunities on a regular basis
to return the doctrine of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause to its conservative roots. Between 1977 and 1987, the
Supreme Court decided no fewer than eleven cases addressing due
133
process limitations on personal jurisdiction.
The first of these eleven cases, Shaffer v. Heitner,13 4 as might
well be expected, functioned as a kind of transitional case. On the
one hand, it marked the final advance of liberalism-the last personal jurisdiction case in which liberalism occupied new ground.
On the other hand, it established a firm beachhead for the conservative resurgence.
A. Liberalism's Final Frontier: The Reconceptualization of
Pennoyer
In Shaffer, the defendants were officers or directors of the
Greyhound Bus Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona.135 The plaintiff brought a shareholder's derivative suit based on actions by the defendants which
had resulted in Greyhound being held liable for damages in an an132

See Louis, supra note 131, at 407.

133 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petro-

leum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance
Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuck, 444
U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
134 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
135 Id. at 189.
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titrust suit and a criminal contempt proceeding. 1 6
The plaintiff brought the suit in Delaware state court, arguing
that the court had quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendants
because they held stock in Greyhound." 7 A Delaware statute
deemed stock in Delaware corporations to be present in
13 8
Delaware.
The Supreme Court held on a 7-1 vote, with Justice Rehnquist
taking no part and Justice Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part, that the Delaware state court had no jurisdiction over
the defendants.13 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall set
out to re-examine the "continued soundness of the conceptual
structure" found in Pennoyer.4 0
As noted above,' one of the effects of mid-twentieth century
jurisprudence was the collapse of the distinction between personal
and property rights. Without a distinction between personal and
property rights, the distinction between in personam and in rem
jurisdiction seemed to lose its justification. Thus, Justice Marshall's re-examination of Pennoyer's conceptual structure began
with an acknowledgement that references to judicial jurisdiction
over a thing were merely a customary way of referring to "jurisdiction over the interests of a person in a thing." That is, all proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are
characterized as in personam or in rem depends on the number of
persons affected.

42

If all assertions of power were against persons, there was no
justification for testing assertions of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction by a different test than in personam jurisdiction. If a direct
assertion of power over a defendant in a particular case would violate the Due Process Clause, an indirect assertion of power should
be impermissible as well.' 43 The Court thus concluded that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny. 144
To the extent that Pennoyer or other prior decisions were inconsis136 Id. at 190.
137 Id. at 191-92.
138Id. at 192.
130 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216-17.
140 Id. at 196.
141 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
14I Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 n.22.
141 Id. at 209.
144 Id. at 212.
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tent with this standard, they were overruled.1 45
Shaffer, in other words, held that assertions of jurisdiction
must be based on a "substantial modern justification. '146 The
Court would not "perpetuat[e] ancient forms that [were] no longer
justified. ' 147 The shift from the rigid Pennoyer rule to the flexible
standard of InternationalShoe applied to quasi in rem and in rem
as well as in personam jurisdiction. Another of the rigid categories
that had characterized late nineteenth century conservative jurisprudence had crumbled.
Conservative Justice Powell concurred, but was wary of the
scope of the victory for liberal jurisprudence staked out by Justice
Marshall. Justice Powell agreed that the principles of International Shoe should be extended to govern in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. 48 Justice Powell, however, would have reserved judgment on the question whether ownership of property
located in the forum state, without more, was sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over the owner to the extent of the value of the property.149 In the case of real property in particular, Justice Powell
argued, preserving traditional quasi in rem jurisdiction could avoid
the "uncertainty" of the International Shoe standard. 150 Justice
Powell, in other words, would have preferred that the Court create
a rigid rule for quasi in rem jurisdiction with respect to real property as a kind of exception to the general InternationalShoe standard. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed.1 51
B.

The Conservative Beachhead: Purposeful Availment

1.

Shaffer v. Heitner

Hanson had attempted to resurrect all of the elements of the
conservative doctrine of personal jurisdiction. That is, it had (1)
required purposeful availment by the defendant as a condition of
jurisdiction; (2) used the purposeful availment requirement to
limit the expansion of state court jurisdiction; and (3) recast perId. at 212 n.39.
1

Id. at 212.

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
149 Id.
150 Id.
Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist took no part in the considera-

tion or decision of the case. Id. at 217.
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sonal jurisdiction more in the form of a fixed rule than a flexible
standard. With respect to the third of these objectives, Shaffer
represented a setback for conservativism because it brought in rem
as well as in personam jurisdiction under the flexible International
Shoe standard.
With respect to the first two objectives, however, Shaffer was
a victory for conservative ideology. It affirmed the purposeful
availment requirement and used it to halt the expansion of judicial
jurisdiction. More specifically, applying the International Shoe
standard to the facts, the Court held that mere stock ownership in
a Delaware corporation did not constitute purposeful availment of
the laws of Delaware, and thus the Delaware courts had no jurisdiction over the officers and directors." 2
Justice Brennan dissented, refusing to concede the political dimension of the case. Agreeing that the proper test was the International Shoe standard, Justice Brennan argued, relying on McGee, that the state had sufficient interests to justify the assertion
of jurisdiction. 153 Justice Brennan would have based liability not
on the volitional conduct of the defendant, but on the state's regulatory interests. These included "a substantial interest" in providing a restitutionary remedy for local corporations that have been
the victims of misconduct,1 54 a "manifest regulatory interest" over
the affairs of domestic corporations, 55 and a "recognized interest
the
in affording a convenient forum for supervising and overseeing
56
affairs of an entity that is purely the creation of [its] law.'
Shifting to the Hanson rule, Justice Brennan noted that he
would have approached it "differently" than the majority. 57 The
defendants had "voluntarily associated" themselves with Delaware
by entering into a long-term relationship with one of its domestic
corporations. 158 Given this degree of voluntariness, Justice Brennan did not believe it "unfair" to subject the defendants to the
jurisdiction of the Delaware courts. 59 For Justice Brennan, the ultimate question was whether jurisdiction was fair under the circumstances. Although the existence of purposeful conduct could be
152

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215-16.

153Id.
154Id.
165

at 222-24 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
at 223.

Id.

156Id.
15I Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 227.
153Id.
159 Id. at 227-28.
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one factor indicating that jurisdiction was fair, Justice Brennan
would have accepted a more attenuated degree of purposefulness
than the majority. Justice Brennan thus fought the conservatives
on two fronts: he resisted making purposeful availment the central
focus of personal jurisdiction, and he argued that, in any event, a
weak form of purposefulness should suffice.
2. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
Shaffer's embrace of the purposeful availment test was reaffirmed three years later in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. 160 As in Hanson, the Court (1) required purposeful
availment as a condition of state court jurisdiction; (2) used that
concept to limit jurisdiction; and (3) attempted to recast personal
jurisdiction in a form more closely approximating a rigid rule.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendants were an automobile retailer and its wholesaler, both New York corporations, that
had sold an Audi automobile to Harry and Kay Robinson in New
York. 161 The following year, the Robinsons decided to drive to Arizona where they had purchased a new home. 6 2 As the Robinsons

were driving through Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi
causing a fire which injured three members of the family. 6 ' The
Robinsons filed suit against the defendants in Oklahoma.'"
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the
Oklahoma court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.6 5
The Robinsons presented no evidence that the defendants conducted any business in Oklahoma, sold or shipped any products
there, had any agents to receive process there, or advertised in that
state."66 The record did not indicate that any car sold by either
defendant, with the sole exception of the Robinsons' Audi, had
ever even entered Oklahoma.

67

a. The Conservative Majority
The Court held on a 6-3 vote, in an opinion written by Justice
160 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
161Id. at 288.
162
163

Id.
Id.

Id.
165 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
166 Id. at 289.
164

167 Id.
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White, that Oklahoma had no jurisdiction over the defendants because they had not purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. 165 The clear message was that,
if the purposeful availment test could not be met, the Interna9
tional Shoe standard could not be satisfied.16
The Robinsons had argued that it was foreseeable that the
Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma, and thus the Oklahoma
courts should have jurisdiction. 17 0 Foreseeability alone, however,
was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause.' 7 ' The Court specifically stated that:

the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antici-

pate being haled into court there.171
Thus, purposeful availment required that jurisdiction be based on
the defendant's own conduct.
Emphasizing the necessity of volitional conduct by the defendant, the Court quoted the language from Hanson holding that the
"unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State."' 5 In this case, the Audi had found its way
to Oklahoma as a result of the unilateral act of the Robinsons, not
as a result of the defendant's conduct. The Oklahoma courts,
therefore, had no jurisdiction.
Justice White's opinion noted that, had the car reached
Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-99. Justice White began his discussion by noting that jurisdiction existed
only if it was reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in the forum state. Id.
at 292. The reasonableness of such a requirement depended upon several factors. Id. The
primary concern was the burden on the defendant. Id. Other factors included the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies, and the interest of the states in furthering substantive social
policies. Id. This part of his opinion, with its emphasis on a multi-factored reasonableness
standard, might have been written by the liberal dissenters in Hanson.See id. at 292. In the
end, however, the elaborately formulated standard turned out to be essentially irrelevant to
the decision. The Court did not attempt to apply these factors to the facts, but held that
jurisdiction did not exist because of the absence of purposeful availment. Id. at 299.
170 World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
16

169

271 Id.
172 Id.
17

Id.

at 297.
at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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Oklahoma as a result of "the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in

other States," jurisdiction would have existed. " 4 For example, jurisdiction would exist where the defendant "delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State."1 5 In such cases, the
defendant's contact with the forum state would be attributed to
the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral acts of
others.
The Court explained the reasons for its insistence upon purposeful availment by the defendant. Such a requirement "gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit. '"17 6 A defendant with "clear notice" that it is subject

to suit in the forum state can insure against liability or sever its
connections 1with
the forum and thus avoid risk to which it does
77
not consent.

These considerations of predictability and notice also underlay
the conservatives' preference for a jurisprudence of rules rather
than standards. Once again, the premises of conservative political
and jurisprudential ideology mutually reinforced each other.
b. The Liberal Dissents
Justice Brennan dissented, reiterating the position of the dissenters in Hanson. First, he rejected the requirement of purposeful
availment. Rather, he insisted, the "clear focus" of the International Shoe test "was on fairness and reasonableness.1' 7 He argued that, in International Shoe, "the existence of contacts, so
long as there were some, was merely one way of giving content to
the determination of fairness and reasonableness.'

'7 9

The important consideration in determining fairness and reasonableness was the weight of the state's interest in adjudicating
the case. Justice Brennan noted that the interest of the forum
state and its connection to the litigation were strong because
174

Id. at 297.

175

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.

171

Id. at 297.

Id.
Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177
178
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Oklahoma was the site of the accident and the place where the
plaintiffs were hospitalized when the suit was filed. 80° Evidence
and witnesses were in Oklahoma, and the state had an interest in
enforcing its laws and keeping its highways safe."'1 In addition, the
defendants had derived substantial benefits from the forum state.
Specifically, Oklahoma's building of highways and its protection of
other automobile dealers who would service the Robinson's Audi
facilitated interstate82travel and thus enhanced the value of the defendants' business.1

Indeed, Justice Brennan called in quite explicit terms for a reduced emphasis on "the rights of defendants." After quoting Justice Black's remarks in McGee concerning the trend toward expanding jurisdiction, he noted that the nationalization of
commerce and ease of transportation and communication had accelerated since 1957, when McGee was decided. 8 3 Thus, "constitu-

tional concepts of fairness no longer require[d] the extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary.'

81 4

Justice Brennan

chastised the majority for "accord[ing] too little weight to the
strength of the forum State's interest in the case .... ,18 5 Jurisdiction should be based on the state's regulatory interests, not the
volitional conduct of the defendant.
Justice Brennan repeated his tactic from Shaffer of attempting to define purposefulness in an attenuated way, while also opposing any requirement of purposefulness. He argued that the defendants were "not unconnected with the forum"' 8 because "[t]he
sale of an automobile does purposefully inject the vehicle into the
stream of interstate commerce so that it can travel to distant
States.' 8 7 The dealer could foresee *that the car would go to
Oklahoma and actually intended to sell a commodity which, by its
very nature, would travel to distant states."'
Justice Marshall, writing a separate dissent in which Justice
Blackmun concurred, agreed. 8 Justices Marshall and Blackmun
:so Id. at 305.
181

Id.

182 Id. at 307.
183

Id. at 308.

'" World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309.
185

Id. at 299.

188 Id.

187 Id. at 306.
188 Id.

188 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although
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found that jurisdiction was based on the "deliberate and purposeful actions of the defendants themselves in choosing to become
part of a nationwide, indeed
a global, network for marketing and
'1 90
servicing automobiles."

Under the dissenters' analysis, the volitional act was merely
going into the business of selling automobiles. No further intent
with respect to the forum state was necessary. Indeed, once the
seller was in the business, efforts to limit state power over it would
be unavailing. "It may be true," Justice Brennan explained, "that
each [defendant] sincerely intended to limit its commercial impact
to the limited territory ....

But obviously these were unrealistic

hopes that cannot be treated as an automatic constitutional
shield." 191 Justice Marshall similarly noted that "[s]ome activities
by their very nature may foreclose the option of conducting them
in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in multiple forums."'9 2
The dissenters thus sought to build a law of personal jurisdiction with respect to the sale of commodities that, in its structure,
closely approximated modern strict products liability. 9 3 In strict

products liability, the defendant is liable for injuries caused by his
products even though his only volitional act was to go into the bus19 4
iness of selling a product that could cause this type of injury.
Imposition of liability is fair because of the manufacturer's ability
to spread the risk. 95 Further, attempts to limit liability by contract-based actions such as disclaimers of warranty often are disregarded. 9 ' The seller cannot contract his way out of liability, once
he performs the initial act of selling the product.
So, too, in the liberal jurisdictional analysis, the single volitional act of placing the product in the stream of commerce conferred jurisdiction on the state where the product caused injury. As
joining with Marshall in his dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote separately to make clear that,
for him, the "critical factor" was the "nature of the instrumentality," which was intended to
travel to distant places. Id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction,1980 Sup.CT. REv. 77, 92-96 (Philip B. Kirkland & Gerhard Casper eds.). Professor Brilmayer has noted the analogy between substantive tort doctrine and minimum
contacts analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen.
I9 See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 692-94.
19
KErTON ET AL., supra note 12, at 693.
196 KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 692.
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Justice Marshall noted, the profits from this activity may be used
to pay the costs of suit and the risk can be spread by obtaining
insurance. 197 Attempts to limit liability by bargaining only in certain jurisdictions would be disregarded.
The second element of the Hanson dissent adopted by the dissenters in World-Wide Volkswagen was to oppose the majority's
attempt to limit the expansion of personal jurisdiction. All of the
dissenters, of course, would have found jurisdiction on the facts of
this case. Indeed, Justice Brennan, as noted above, 19 8 observed
that the changes in transportation and communication which had
justified a more expansive view of jurisdiction actually had accelerated. The obvious suggestion was that jurisdiction should continue
to expand.
Finally, like the dissenters in Hanson, the dissenters in
World-Wide Volkswagen opposed the attempt to rigidify the InternationalShoe standard. The Court in InternationalShoe, Justice Brennan argued, had "specifically declined to establish a
mechanical test based on the quantum of contacts between a State
and the defendant."' 9 9 In other words, InternationalShoe had established a standard to be applied to the facts of each case and
that standard was fairness and reasonableness. Justice Marshall
similarly observed that "[t]he concepts of fairness and substantial
justice . . . are not readily susceptible of further definition ... and
it is not surprising that the constitutional standard is easier to
' 20 0
state than to apply.
After World-Wide Volkswagen, it was clear that a majority of
the Court believed that the InternationalShoe test was satisfied
only where the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the
benefits and protections of the forum state's laws. Nor was this a
sterile debate over a technicality. Each of the three cases requiring
purposeful availment up to that point-Hanson, Shaffer, and
World-Wide Volkswagen-had found it wanting. The purposeful
availment requirement clearly had the power to limit state court
jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's attempt to focus attention on the court's
regulatory interests and the overall fairness of jurisdiction had
been unsuccessful. Beginning with World-Wide Volkswagen, the
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
199 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197

099
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terms of the debate began to shift. The argument was not over
whether purposeful availment would be required, but how to define the degree of purposefulness needed.
Because purposeful availment had not been found in any Supreme Court decision since Hanson, it was less clear whether purposeful availment was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Although
the Court decided several personal jurisdiction cases in the interim, 0 1 it was not until the Court's 1985 decision in Burger King
201 In 1984, the Supreme Court decided three cases by lopsided majorities without really answering that question. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Court
held that the sale of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of a magazine in New Hampshire each
month was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Id. at 772-75. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court began its due process discussion with language that could
have been written by Justice Brennan. Rehnquist began by asking whether it was "fair" to
require the defendant to appear in New Hampshire. Id. at 775. He then inquired whether
New Hampshire had a legitimate interest in adjudicating the claim. After a fairly extensive
discussion which concluded that New Hampshire did have such an interest, id. at 775-78,
Justice Rehnquist observed that the defendant had "continuously and deliberately exploited
the New Hampshire market." Id. at 781. Accordingly, the state had jurisdiction. Id. Thus, it
seemed that InternationalShoe required fairness, which in turn required both that the
state have an interest in the adjudication and that the defendant had purposefully reached
out to the state. No member dissented, although Justice Brennan wrote separately concurring in the judgment. Id. at 782.
In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), decided the same day, the Court held unanimously that California had personal jurisdiction over a reporter and editor for the National
Enquirer with respect to a professional entertainer's libel claim against them. Id. at 788-89.
The article in which the reporter and editor were involved was drawn from California
sources and caused harm in California, where the plaintiff resided. Id. Jurisdiction was
proper based on the effects in California of the defendants' out-of-state conduct. Id. at 789.
The Court noted that defendants' "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California." Id. That is, the defendants participated "in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on
that basis." Id. at 790. Calder seemed to suggest that the defendants' purposeful conduct
directed at the forum state was sufficient. The discussion of the state's interest which occupied most of the Keeton opinion was absent.
Finally, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the
Court decided by a 8-1 vote that the Texas courts had no jurisdiction over a Colombian
corporation in a wrongful death action. Id. at 418-19. All the parties conceded that plaintiff's claims did not "arise out of" and were "not related to" the defendant's activities in
Texas. Id. at 415. Helicopterosthus differed from nearly all other prior personal jurisdiction
cases before the Supreme Court in that it involved an assertion of general jurisdiction rather
than specific jurisdiction. Citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952), the Court held that a state could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant for a claim
unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum state only if the defendant's contacts
with that state were "continuous and systematic." 466 U.S. at 415-17. The defendant's contacts-sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a session of contract negotiations;
accepting checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment and training
services from a Texas corporation; and sending personnel to Texas for training-did not
meet this test. Id. at 416-18. Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 419.
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Corp. v. Rudzewicz 0 2 that the question finally was answered.
C.

The Liberal Counterattack:Burger King

Contemporary personal jurisdiction doctrine crystallized in
Burger King. The decision established once and for all the necessity of purposeful availment, while resolving the question of the
relationship between the purposeful availmnent requirement and
the other factors discussed in cases dating back to McGee. Burger
King also represented a liberal counterattack against the resurgence of conservative ideology in personal jurisdiction cases. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan managed to weaken the purposeful availment test while softening the rigidity that had
characterized Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen.
In Burger King, the defendants were two Michigan residents
who had acquired a franchise from the Burger King Corporation.2'"
The defendants had applied for this franchise at Burger King's
Michigan office, but had conducted some negotiations directly with
Burger King's corporate headquarters in Florida. 4 The franchise
agreement contained a Florida choice of law clause and required
that monthly payments be made to the Florida office.20 5 When the
defendants fell behind in their payments, Burger King brought
suit against them in federal district court in Florida. 06
The Supreme Court held that Florida had jurisdiction over the
defendants.20 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan formulated the most thorough explication of the requirements for personal jurisdiction since InternationalShoe.
The standard for personal jurisdiction now was a two-step
test. First, the defendant must have "'purposefully directed' his
activities at residents of the forum. ' 20 8 The "'unilateral activity'"
of another person could not satisfy the requirement of the defendant's purposeful contact with the forum. 0 9 At the same time, the
requirement of purposeful availment could be met by placing-a
product in the stream of commerce with the expectation that it
202

471 U.S. 462 (1985).

203

Id. at 466-67.
Id.
Id. at 465-66.

204

20

200 Id. at 468.
207 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487.
211 Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984)).
209 Id. at 474 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).

IDEOLOGY

1993]

would reach consumers in the forum.21 0
Once the requirement of purposeful contacts was satisfied, the
court must then consider the contacts in light of other factors to
determine whether jurisdiction would be consistent with fair play
and substantial justice, that is, whether it would be reasonable.2 11
These factors were those listed, but essentially disregarded, in the
Court's analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen:222 the burden on the
defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
the judicial system's interest in efficient dispute resolution, and the
interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.2 13
Justice Brennan thus fused the purposeful availment test from
Hanson with the reasonableness test from McGee. Jurisdiction
would not lie unless the defendant had satisfied the Hanson purposeful availment test. Indeed, once it was shown that the defendant had purposefully directed his activities at the forum, to defeat
jurisdiction the defendant "must present a compelling case that
the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. '214 In other words, once purposeful availment
was shown, the burden actually shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that the reasonableness test was not met.
At the same time, the various factors demonstrating the reasonableness of jurisdiction, on occasion, could serve to establish jurisdiction "upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would
otherwise be required. '215 That is, more attenuated purposeful
contacts would suffice if other facts evidencing reasonableness were
sufficiently present.
Justice Brennan's opinion was a brilliant exercise of synthesis.
He managed to organize a long series of decisions that had really
established only two points: that purposeful avaihnent was a prerequisite of personal jurisdiction, and that other facts were to be
taken into account as well. Justice Brennan solved the riddle of the
relationship between the purposeful availment test and the other
factors. He also persuaded the majority to join an opinion creating
20 Id. at 473.
211

Id. at 476-77.

212 See supra note 169.
2'3
214
210

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

Id.
Id.
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a framework that was closer to the liberal position than any opinion of the Court since McGee.
As mentioned previously, since the decision in Hanson, the
Supreme Court had refused to find that the International Shoe
standard was met in any case in which purposeful availment was
not shown. Unable to kill the purposeful availment test, Justice
Brennan defanged it. Where the reasonableness of jurisdiction was
sufficiently established, the Court held, a weaker showing of purposeful availment would suffice. The Court accepted Justice Brennan's preferred test of reasonableness under the circumstances as a
substantial, if not complete, substitute for purposeful availment.
Inasmuch as no Supreme Court case after Mullane in 1950 had
found personal jurisdiction without some form of purposeful activity directed at the forum state, Justice Brennan could hardly have
hoped for more.
Purposeful availment-at least in anything other than its most
attenuated form-was, of course, considerably more than Justice
Brennan would have required to find personal jurisdiction. Thus,
where purposeful availment is shown, the reasonableness test
largely disappears. Indeed, in the Burger King formulation, the
burden actually shifts to the defendant to show compelling reasons
why jurisdiction is not reasonable.
In addition to moving the Court closer to the liberal view that
personal jurisdiction could be premised on a weak showing of purposeful conduct by the defendant, Burger King also softened the
mechanical approach which had characterized World-Wide Volkswagen. Justice Brennan's sliding scale-less purposeful availment
necessary where more reasonableness is shown, and little reasonableness necessary where purposeful availment is established-in
form was a move back toward the liberal standard of reasonableness under the circumstances and away from Justice White's attempt in World-Wide Volkswagen to write more rigid rules.
Applying the law to the facts, the Court found that the defendant had "purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Florida's laws. '216 The Court "rejected the notion that
personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests."2 1 Thus,
the mere fact of a contract between the defendant and a corpora218

Id.

at 482 (quoting Burger King v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984)

(Johnson, J., dissenting)).
211 Id.
at 478 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
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tion in the forum state was not necessarily enough for jurisdiction.
Here, however, the defendant had "deliberately 'reached out beyond' Michigan"2 1 in order to affiliate with a national organization-an affiliation which was long term and involved exacting regulation of his business from Florida. The Florida choice of law
provision in particular showed a purposeful invocation of the benefits and protections of Florida's laws. 2 19
Further, the defendant had failed to show facts that would
"persuasively . . . outweigh" the fact of purposeful availment.220
The Court could not conclude that Florida had no legitimate interest in adjudicating the claim. 22 1 To the extent that the defendant
was inconvenienced by litigating in Florida,
that problem was best
222
handled through a change of venue.
D. Political Stalemate: Asahi Metal
In a series of decisions handed down between 1977 and 1985,
the Court had made it clear that purposeful availment, resurrected
by Shaffer in 1977, was the sine qua non of personal jurisdiction
under the InternationalShoe standard. By the time of the Court's
1985 decision in Burger King, even Justice Brennan had surrendered to the conservative insistence that liability be based on the
defendant's volitional conduct.
By 1987, the conservative bloc on the Court had grown at the
expense of the centrists to include Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Powell, Scalia, and O'Connor. The centrist membership
had shrunk to three-Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and White. Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to occupy the liberal wing.
Having established the necessity of purposeful availment, an
increasingly conservative Court shifted its agenda to requiring
even greater degrees of purposeful conduct. At the same time, the
Court endeavored to restore to personal jurisdiction doctrine at
least some of the rigidity of the Pennoyer rule.
The efforts of the conservative bloc to push personal jurisdiction doctrine to the right resulted in a stalemate in two successive
decisions. Burger King, decided in 1985, remains the last Supreme
218 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S.

643, 647 (1950)).

Id. at
Id. at
221 Id. at
222 Id. at
210

220

481-82.
482.
482-83.
483-84.
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Court personal jurisdiction case to produce a majority opinion.
The first stalemate came in 1987 with the Court's decision in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.22 3 In that case, the
plaintiff was a motorcyclist who was injured in a crash on a California highway allegedly caused by an explosion in the rear tire of
the motorcycle.2 24 The plaintiff filed suit in California state court
against the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire and against Asahi
Metal, a Japanese company that had manufactured the tire's valve
assembly. 225 Eventually all claims were settled, except for an indemnity action by the tire manufacturer against Asahi Metal,
2 26
which sought to quash the summons.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the California court had personal jurisdiction over Asahi Metal. 227 The
Court held unanimously that it did not, but divided sharply on the
reasons. All members of the Court concurred that Brennan's opinion from Burger King set forth the governing standards, but disagreed over how they applied.
The justices split into two camps, one conservative and one
liberal, on the issue of whether the defendant had satisfied the
purposeful availment test. The ninth member of the Court, Justice
Stevens, would not have reached that question. 228 Eight members
of the Court, however, agreed that jurisdiction over Asahi Metal
did not exist because jurisdiction would not be reasonable.22 9
The divisions were reflected in the two major opinions written
in the case. The first was that of Justice O'Connor, who (1) announced the judgment of the Court, (2) delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to the reasonableness test, and (3) wrote for
a conservative group of four justices on the issue of purposeful
availment. The second was that of Justice Brennan, who set forth
the liberal position on purposeful availment, which also reflected
the view of four justices.
Whether Asahi Metal had purposefully directed activities at
California turned on the meaning of the stream of commerce doctrine enunciated in World- Wide Volkswagen. Justice White's opin-

227

480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 108.

228

Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 121-22.

22

Id. at 116.

223
224
225
226
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ion for the Court in that case had stated, albeit in dictum, that
"[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.

' 23 0

Al-

though in such a situation the product may be transported to the
forum state by parties other than the defendant, the act of taking
the product to the forum will be regarded as the purposeful direction of activities toward the forum state by the defendant- rather
than the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship"
with the defendant. 3 1
The conservative group, comprising Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Powell, sought to require a higher level of purposeful activity as a necessary condition for the exercise of state
power. Specifically, Justice O'Connor argued that "a defendant's
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of
placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State."23 2 In other words, placing a product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that it would
reach the forum state was not purposeful availment. Rather, a conclusion that the defendant purposefully directed its activities toward the forum state required some additional conduct. Such conduct might include designing the product for the market in the
forum state, advertising in that state, setting up a customer service
network in the state, or marketing through sales agents there.233
The record contained evidence that Asahi Metal was "fully
aware" that its valve stems would be marketed in California. 3 4 In
the conservative view, however, this mere awareness was insufficient. Asahi Metal had not engaged in any of the additional conduct, beyond mere awareness, necessary to establish purposeful
availment. It had no offices, property, or agents in California, did
not advertise or solicit business there, did not design its product in
anticipation of sales in California, and did not design or control
the distribution system that carried its products there.23 5 The Cali11o

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.

231 Id. at 298.
232
233

22
235

Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112.

Id.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 112-13.
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fornia courts thus had no personal jurisdiction over Asahi Metal.
The liberal group, comprising Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and White, would have permitted the exercise of state
power over Asahi Metal on a lesser showing of purposeful conduct
by the defendant. Specifically, the liberal group rejected the need
for a showing of additional conduct beyond placing a product in
the stream of commerce with awareness that it may or will reach
the forum state. As Justice Brennan explained,
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or
eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant
in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed
in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come
as a surprise. Nor would the litigation present a burden for which
there is no corresponding benefit.286
The liberals charged that Justice O'Connor's opinion represented "a marked retreat" from the Court's analysis in WorldWide Volkswagen. The charge gained considerable weight from the
fact that Justice White, who wrote for the majority in World-Wide
Volkswagen, joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi Metal. The
liberals argued that World-Wide Volkswagen had required only
that the defendant place the product in the stream of commerce
with the "expectation" that it would reach the forum state.2 ' 7 This

expectation was sufficient to serve the ends of the purposeful availment requirement: to permit the defendant either to insure against
litigation or to avoid litigation by severing ties with the forum
state.238
Justice Stevens, the deciding vote on the purposeful availment
issue, wrote a separate opinion arguing that the issue need not be
reached since jurisdiction over Asahi Metal, in any event, was not
reasonable.23 9 To the extent that the issue should have been
reached, moreover, Justice Stevens disagreed with both Justice
O'Connor and Justice Brennan, believing that it was not possible
to draw "an unwavering line" between "mere awareness" and
"purposeful availment."2' 0 Rather, Justice Stevens would have engaged in a case-by-case determination based on "the volume, the
236

23
238
239

2,0

Id. at
Asahi
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

117.
Metal, 480 U.S. at 119 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
119.
121.
122.
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value, and the hazardous character of the components. '2 41 He did
indicate that, "[i]n most circumstances" involving the volume of
sales present in Asahi Metal, he would find purposeful availment
to exist.242
The ideological split over the degree of purposefulness required, as noted above, ultimately did not affect the disposition of
the case. All of the justices, save Justice Scalia, 43 concurred in the
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion that found that California's
exercise of244 jurisdiction over Asahi Metal would not be
reasonable.

E. JurisprudentialStalemate: Burnham
Ideological stalemate reappeared three years later in Burnham
v. Superior Court. 45 This time, the stalemate arose from another
attempt by the conservative bloc to push the jurisprudential dimension of personal jurisdiction doctrine further to the right.
In Burnham, the defendant, Dennis Burnham, and his wife
had separated while living in New Jersey, with Mrs. Burnham
moving to California and taking custody of their children.246 A few
months later, the defendant traveled to southern California on
business. 247 After concluding his business, he went north to the
San Francisco Bay area, where his wife resided, to visit his chilId.
2,2 Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 122. Justices White and Blackmun, who joined Justice
Brennan's opinion on the meaning of purposeful availment, also joined with Justice Stevens.
Presumably they were sympathetic with his view that purposeful availment need not be
reached; but if it was reached, they were prepared to find it under either Justice Brennan's
approach or Justice Stevens'.
242 The opinion does not explain Justice Scalia's reasons for refusing to join in this
portion. One explanation may be that, having decided that the purposeful availment test
was not met, Justice Scalia saw no reason to reach the issue of the reasonableness of the
Court's jurisdiction-an approach perfectly consistent with Justice Brennan's two-step test
from Burger King. A second explanation may be that Justice Scalia objected to the reasonableness test, which, after all, was the legacy of Justice Brennan and the liberal wing of the
241

Court.

244 Applying the five factors listed by Justice Brennan in Burger King (taken from Justice White's opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen), the Court found the burden on an alien
defendant to be "severe." Id. at 114. At the same time, inasmuch as the only claim still
remaining was an indemnification claim between two foreign corporations based on a transaction which had occurred in Taiwan, neither the plaintiff's interest in a convenient or effective forum nor California's interest in adjudicating the dispute was sufficient to outweigh
the burden on the defendant. Id.
245 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
246 Id. at 607.

117 Id. at 608.

-
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dren.245 While there, he was served with a summons in a divorce
suit filed by Mrs. Burnham in California state court earlier that
249
month.
The Supreme Court held unanimously that Burnham's presence in the state at the time he was served with process was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the California courts.2 50 As in
Asahi Metal, however, the unanimity of result was accompanied by
sharp disagreement over the grounds for the result.
Once again, two major opinions represented the opposite poles
of the ideological split. The split, however, fell not in the political,
but the jurisprudential dimension. All nine justices agreed that the
California court had power over the defendant, although they disagreed about the nature of the standard to be applied.2 5 '
1.

The Conservative Position

The conservative position was articulated by Justice Scalia,
who announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion
joined by conservative Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy and, in
part, by his more moderate colleague, Justice White. The conservative position was that any procedure which "'has been immemorially the actual law of the land ... is due process.' ",252 Cases and
commentary dating back to the early nineteenth century satisfied
the conservatives that jurisdiction based on presence was an accepted practice under the common law before Pennoyer.253 Because it is "one of the continuing traditions of our legal system,"
jurisdiction based on physical presence alone must be consistent
with due process. 25 4 Indeed, the conservatives argued, presence was
part of the tradition that defined InternationalShoe's standard of
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and thus it
Id.
Id.
220 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628.
251 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote separately, explaining that
the broad reach of both Justice Scalia's conservative opinion and Justice Brennan's liberal
opinion prevented him from joining either. Id. He noted simply that the historical evidence
identified by Justice Scalia, the fairness considerations identified by Justice Brennan, and
the common sense displayed by Justice White in a separate concurrence all combined to
suggest that this was a "very easy case" for affirmance of the California court's jurisdiction.
Id.
252 Id. at 619 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884)) (emphasis
added).
262 Id. at 610-16.
248
249

21

Id. at 619.
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would be "perverse" to say 2that
presence could be held unconstitu55
tional under that standard.

The strongest obstacle to the conservative position was the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.256 Shaffer had stated quite clearly that
"all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny.

' 257

This seemed to suggest that presence was a sufficient basis

for personal jurisdiction only if it satisfied the two-part Burger
King test.
The three conservatives, however, rejected this reading of
Shaffer, with centrist Justice White refusing to join this portion of
the opinion. 5 Claiming that the quoted language could be properly understood only in context, 259 Justice Scalia argued that Shaf-

fer had addressed merely the question whether quasi in rem jurisdiction should be measured by the same standards as in personam
jurisdiction. Thus, when Shaffer said "all assertions," it did not
really mean "all assertions," but only "assertions of quasi in rem
jurisdiction.

'260

Shaffer remained good law insofar as it subjected

assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction to the InternationalShoe
standard, but it could not be read to require that presence meet
this standard as well.
Justice Scalia openly conceded that his "basic approach" to
due process was different from that adopted by the Court in
2155Burnham, 495

U.S. at 619.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
257 Id. at 212.
259 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring). Justice White wrote a separate opinion explaining that he had joined in the first part of Justice Scalia's opinion be256

cause jurisdiction based on presence was "so widely accepted throughout this country that I

could not possibly strike it down." Id. On the other hand, Justice White, unlike the conservatives, would not rule out categorically the re-evaluation of "traditionally accepted proce-

dures" where they were shown to be "so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many
instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case." Id. Since no such
showing had been made, he declined to engage in a determination whether presence was an

arbitrary basis of jurisdiction in this case. Id.
259 Id. at 620. The Court had said:

The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form with-

out substantial modem justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to
allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.

We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.

Id. at 620-21 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
260 Id. at 621.
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Shaffer, although he was not challenging the narrow holding in
that case.26 l Unlike the Court in Shaffer, the conservatives in
Burnham would conduct no "independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule.

'262

Rather,

the historical "pedigree" of presence alone was sufficient to validate it under the Due Process Clause. 63
For the conservatives, Burnham presented an opportunity to
stage an attack against the InternationalShoe line of cases on jurisprudential grounds. Deeply disturbed by the subjectivity of the
flexible standard adopted by the Court in International Shoe and
applied to "all assertions" of jurisdiction in Shaffer,264 the conservatives sought to reinsert a degree of rigidity into the test for determining whether exercises of jurisdiction were consistent with due
process. They attempted to convert the International Shoe standard back to a set of rules and thus retake some of the ground lost
by conservative ideology in Shaffer.
The first rule proposed by the conservatives was borrowed
from the late nineteenth century decision in Hurtado v. California:266 that which "has been immemorially the actual law of the
land . . . is due process. "266 They proposed, in effect, a kind of
metatest: a test for identifying the test which governs the case, and
the metatest itself turned out to be a formal, rigid rule.
The rule that historical pedigree could validate an exercise of
personal jurisdiction in the best formalist tradition was general,
abstract, and seemingly mechanical in its application.26 Further, if
adopted, it actually displaced the flexible InternationalShoe standard in any case in which a historic pedigree for a rule could be
identified. The conservatives proposed not merely moving the InternationalShoe standard closer to a rule; they proposed partially
replacing it with a rule.
Id.
Id.
205 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
214 See id. at 623. Justice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's "proposed standard of
'contemporary notions of due process'... measures state court jurisdictions... against each
Justice's subjective assessment of what is fair and just." Id.
261

262

205

110 U.S. 516 (1884).

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528-29).
207 Justices Scalia and Brennan heatedly disputed the actual historical status of jurisdiction based on presence. Justice Brennan, for example, argued that transient jurisdiction
was a nineteenth century creation, which would not have been recognized in more ancient
times, and thus was not "immemorially" the law of the land. Id. at 633-35 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
266
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Finding that jurisdiction based on presence did have a pedigree, the conservatives would have decided the case entirely
outside the InternationalShoe standard. For the first time since
1945, the relevant authority was not InternationalShoe, but Pennoyer. Further, in the view of three conservatives, Shaffer, which
had partially overruled Pennoyer, was to be narrowed
considerably.
Having taken Burnham outside of the InternationalShoe line
of cases, the conservatives proposed their second rule: service
based on presence was a constitutionally sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 2 s The California courts therefore had jurisdiction. The entire case could be decided by the application of two simple rules,
without any reference at all to subjective considerations of fairness
or reasonableness.
Although conservatives generally have opposed expansions of
jurisdiction, Burnham did not represent an expansion. Burnham
only ratified a form of jurisdiction which, in fact, had predated and
was explicitly approved by Pennoyer. A form of jurisdiction acceptable to conservative Justice Field in 1877 was acceptable to
conservative Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy in 1990.
There was no reason for the conservatives to oppose the result in
Burnham on political grounds.269
2.

The Liberal Position

The liberal position was articulated in a concurring opinion by
Justice Brennan in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor joined. 7 0 The liberals agreed with the conservatives that
the Due Process Clause "generally permits a state court to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while voluntarily present in the forum State.

' 27 1

The liberals, however, re-

jected the conservative argument that a rule which has been "im268 Id. at 619.
269 Justice Scalia did suggest in a footnote, however, that the concept of general jurisdiction based on minimum contacts might have represented a regrettable expansion of
power and that, in future cases, it might be limited to cases involving corporations. Id. at
610 n.1.
270 Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's alignment with the liberals
in Burnham is perhaps somewhat surprising because she had written the opinion for the
conservatives in Asahi Metal. The implication seems to be that Justice O'Connor is sympathetic with the political dimension of conservative ideology, but not with the jurisprudential
dimension.
271 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628-29.
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memorially the actual law of the land" ipso facto "comports with
due process simply by virtue of its 'pedigree'" and thus the liberals would undertake an "independent inquiry into the.., fairness
27 2
of the prevailing in-state service rule.
The liberals argued that the conservatives' reliance on pedigree alone was inconsistent with Shaffer's holding that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny. '273 In
other words, the "critical insight" of Shaffer was that all jurisdictional rules "must satisfy contemporary notions of due process."2 74
The historical pedigree of a rule was "an important factor '275 in
determining its constitutionality, but was not "decisive. 2 76 Indeed,
were pedigree alone sufficient, the Court would have had no opportunity to review quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer.
The liberals thus fought the move back to a rule-based jurisprudence every step of the way. They too had a metatest-and it
was a standard, not a rule: all assertions of jurisdiction "must sat277
isfy contemporary notions of due process.
Justice Brennan then proceeded to undertake the independent
inquiry into the fairness of jurisdiction based on presence, applying something very close to the two-part test he had enunciated for
the Court in Burger King. Justice Brennan found that, by visiting
the state, a transient defendant avails himself of the benefits and
protections of the state. 7 8 Finding, in essence, purposeful availment, Justice Brennan then examined the most important factor in
the reasonableness test: the burden on the defendant. Not only
had modern transportation and communication made it "much less
burdensome" to defend oneself in another state, but the fact that
the defendant previously had traveled to the forum indicated that
suit in the forum would not be "prohibitively inconvenient. 2 79
Thus, personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on voluntary
presence generally would satisfy the requirements of due process.2 80 There being no indication that the defendant's presence in
272 Id. at 629 (citations omitted).
2172Id. (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
274
278

Id. at 630.
Id. at 629.

278 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 630 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
277

278
279
280

Id.
Id. at 637-38.
Id.
Id.
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California was anything but voluntary, the California courts had
jurisdiction over him.81
IV.

IDEOLOGY AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

The great majority of Supreme Court cases involving the impact of the Due Process Clause on civil procedure deal with the
subject of personal jurisdiction. There is a second, much smaller,
group of Supreme Court civil procedure cases, however, which also
involve the Due Process Clause. This group comprises those decisions dealing with the constitutionality of provisional remedies.
The provisional remedies cases seem, at first glance, to contradict the personal jurisdiction cases in a fairly striking way. As will
be seen, however, the apparent contradiction masks an underlying
ideological consistency between the two groups of decisions.
A.

The Paradox

A consistent theme in the personal jurisdiction cases is the
split between liberals and conservatives over the weight to be given
to the Due Process Clause. The conservative position may be characterized in broad terms as a persistent attempt to strengthen the
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause, while the liberal
position was to weaken it.
Thus, it was the conservative Court of the Lochner era which
initially proposed the idea in Pennoyer that the Due Process
Clause imposed any limitations on personal jurisdiction.' 2 Similarly, in a line of cases running from Hanson to Asahi Metal, the
conservative wing of the Court would have used the Due Process
Clause to void exercises of personal jurisdiction over defendants,
except in cases in which the defendant had engaged in relatively
significant amounts of purposeful conduct directed at the forum
state.8 3
It was the liberal court of the New Deal era, on the other
hand, which replaced the rigid rule of Pennoyer with the flexible
standard of InternationalShoe.2 s ' Further, in a series of cases running from Mullane to Asahi Metal, the liberals would have permitted courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who
Is' Burnham, 495 U.S. at 640.
282 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 106-200 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
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had engaged in only relatively attenuated forms of purposeful conduct directed at the forum state.2 85 As long as jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances, the Due Process Clause
presented no barrier to its exercise.
In the provisional remedies cases, however, the conservative
and liberal wings of the Court appear to switch sides concerning
the weight to be given the Due Process Clause. Suddenly, it is the
conservative members of the Court who suggest that the Due Process Clause affords relatively little protection for defendants, while
the liberal members support a stronger reading of the Clause.
This line of cases began with the Court's 1972 decision in
Fuentes v. Shevin.8 6 In Fuentes, the Supreme Court held that
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes that permitted the
seizure of a defendant's possessions based on a plaintiff's ex parte
application and the posting of a security bond violated the Due
Process Clause.2 87
The case was decided by a bare 4-3 majority, with liberal Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, joined by their moderate
colleague, Justice Stewart, voting to strike down the statutes. Conservative Chief Justice Burger, joined by moderate Justices Blackmun and White, dissented. Chief Justice Burger's newly-appointed
conservative colleagues, Justices Rehnquist and Powell, had not
been present for oral argument and did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.28 8
Two years later, however, the two new conservative members
of the Court made their impact felt. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
the Court upheld, by a 5-4 vote, a Louisiana sequestration statute
which, like Fuentes, also permitted seizure of the defendant's
property based on an ex parte application and the posting of a
bond.2 9 The alignment of justices was unchanged from Fuentes,
except that Justices Powell and Rehnquist now joined the Fuentes
minority to form a new, conservative majority. Justice White's
opinion for the Court in Mitchell sought to distinguish Fuentes on
the ground that the Louisiana sequestration statute was "sufficiently different" from the replevin statutes in Fuentes. These differences included the fact that (1) the application must allege
See supra notes 87-150 and accompanying text.
286 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
285

288

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97.

289

416 U.S. 600, 600-01 (1974).
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"'specific facts' shown by verified petition or affidavit" and not
merely contain "bare, conclusory claims"; 9 0 (2) the showing must
be made to a judge, not merely a clerk;2" 1 (3) the issues governing
the right to sequestration are limited to "the existence of a vendor's lien and the issue of default," as opposed to the issue of
whether the property had been "wrongfully detained" as in the
Florida and Pennsylvania statutes;292 and (4) following sequestration Louisiana law provided for an "immediate hearing and dissolution of the writ unless the plaintiff proved the grounds upon
which the writ was issued." 293 Because these differences were
thought to "minimize the risk of error, 294 ex parte seizure of the
property was permitted despite the Due Process Clause.
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, 9 5 found the Louisiana statute "constitutionally
indistinguishable" from those in Fuentes."6 The requirement of a
sworn affidavit or verified petition did not so much test the truth
of the allegations as the "strength of the applicant's own belief in

his rights. 2 97 The requirement that a judge issue the writ rather

than a clerk was true only in the Orlean Parish and, in fact, had
been accomplished by a statutory amendment applicable to this
one parish which, according to the official comments, had been intended to make no change in the law.298 Finally, Justice Stewart
denied that there was any difference between a showing that the
defendant was in wrongful possession and a showing that he was in
299
default.

In the view of the dissenters, the decision in Mitchell "unmistakably overruled"300 Fuentes. Further, the "only perceivable
change" that had occurred since Fuentes was decided two years
earlier and that could explain the result in Mitchell, was in the
290

Id. at 616.

291 Id. at 616-17.
292

Id. at 617-18.

211 Id. at 618 (citations omitted).

Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 618.
Id. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The only reference to Justice Brennan's view was
a single sentence, at the close of the Stewart dissent, stating that "Mr. Justice Brennan is in
agreement that Fuentes v. Shevin ... requires reversal of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana." Id. at 636.
29

295

299 Id. at 634.
29 Id. at 632.

Id. (citations omitted).
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 633.
30 Id. at 635.
298

299
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composition of the Court.3 0 1
The following year in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc.,30 2 Justices White and Powell joined the liberals to
strike down on a 7-2 vote a Georgia garnishment statute that authorized the garnishment of a bank account based on an ex parte
application and the posting of a bond. Writing for the majority,
Justice White explained that the Georgia statute had "none of the
saving characteristics" of the Louisiana sequestration statute upheld in Mitchell,30 3 and therefore, Fuentes required its invalidation. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart noted his gratification that he had been mistaken in concluding in Mitchell that
Mitchell had overruled Fuentes. 4
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that Mitchell had "substantially cut back" ' 5 Fuentes, and
thus Fuentes could not be considered "as of much influence or precedent for the present case. 30 6 Justice Blackmun concluded that
the Georgia statute provided all the protections the Due Process
3 07
Clause required.
Justice Powell concurred only in the judgment because he too
believed that North Georgia Finishing "appear[ed] to resuscitate"
Fuentes, which he thought had been "significantly narrowed" 8 ' by
Mitchell. Although Justice Powell would not have required all of
the safeguards present in Mitchell, he concurred in the result because he found the Georgia statute insufficient under even his
weaker view of due process.3 0 9
While Justice White's opinions in Mitchell and North Georgia
Finishing suggest that minor differences in the statutes controlled
the results in all three cases, at least six justices, and perhaps
seven justices, believed that Mitchell had overruled or sharply limited Fuentes.31 0 Thus, what these cases really seem to represent is
301
02

Id.
419 U.S. 601 (1975).

:03Id. at 607-09.
" Id. at 608.
300 Id. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
306 Id. at 616.
North Georgia Finishing,419 U.S. at 619-20.
308 Id.
at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
309Id. at 612-13.
310 See supra note 300 and accompanying text. As noted in the text, Justice Stewart
took the position in his Mitchell dissent, in which he was joined by Justices Douglas and
Marshall, that Mitchell overruled Fuentes. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 635. Justice Powell in his
concurrence in North Georgia Finishing asserted that Mitchell "significantly narrowed"
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a Court sharply divided into a liberal and conservative camp, with
Justice White providing the swing vote.
While the fact of an ideological split is clear enough, it is the
nature of the split that poses the paradox. As noted above, in each
of these provisional remedies cases, it was the conservatives moving to weaken the protection of the Due Process Clause, with the
liberals seeking to strengthen it-the reverse of the position taken
by both wings of the Court in the personal jurisdiction cases.
B. The Paradox Resolved
The paradox is resolved by a closer look at the ideological underpinnings of these three decisions. Although both blocs on the
Court changed positions as to the weight to be afforded the Due
Process Clause, they did so in order to maintain consistency with
another tenet of their respective ideologies: their belief that government power should or should not be subordinate to private will
in the economic sphere.
Although the conservative ideology of the late nineteenth century had proposed a strong Due Process Clause to limit state regulation of the economy, it had not been uniformly opposed to state
power. Rather, conservative ideology opposed the use of state
power to redistribute wealth.311 Indeed, in matters of public law,
conservative ideology had favored an activist Court powerful
3 12
enough to strike down regulatory legislation.
In matters of private law, conservative ideology favored a
Court that was merely facilitative of market arrangements-a
Court that simply enforced private agreements without assessing
their underlying fairness.31 3 In either case, the preference was for a
state that deferred to the existing distribution of wealth reached
through the market.
Each of the three provisional measures cases involved a private party who was seeking to seize property as security for payment under some form of contractual arrangement. The conservaFuentes.North Georgia Finishing,419 U.S. at 609. Justice Blackmun in his dissent in that
same case, joined by Justice Rehnquist, thought Mitchell "substantially cut back" Fuentes.
Id. at 615. Because Justice Brennan dissented in Mitchell on the ground that Fuentes required a different result, Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 636, he arguably constitutes a seventh vote
for the view that Mitchell appeared to overrule Fuentes.
"1 See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
32 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
"x See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
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tives were only too willing to engage the judicial machinery of the
state on behalf of the party seeking to enforce the prior agreement;
that is, to subordinate state power to private will and to facilitate a
market-based arrangement.
Indeed, the conservatives saw the liberal effort to erect the
Due Process Clause as a barrier to provisional remedies as simply
another instance of inefficient government interference in the market. In his Fuentes dissent, Justice White noted that the requirement of a hearing imposed by the majority could be circumvented
by rewriting the credit instrument to include a waiver of the hearing.3 14 The principal effect of the Fuentes decision, he warned,
would be simply to drive up the cost of securing credit, if not elim3 15
inating its availability to certain persons entirely.
Mid-twentieth century liberal ideology, on the other hand,
sought to weaken the Due Process Clause in order to permit the
legislatures to regulate the economy." 6 Liberals objected to the exercise of state power in the provisional remedies cases, however,
because state power in those cases was placed in the hands of a
private party with little or no meaningful judicial supervision. Although the order to seize property may have the signature of a
judge, as in Mitchell, in the absence of a prior adversarial hearing,
the judge's regulatory oversight was of little value. Rather, the
judge was doing little more than handing the power of the state
over to the plaintiff. The liberals' objection was that state power
had been subordinated to private will and used merely to ratify
market-based arrangements.
The exercise of state power in the personal jurisdiction cases,
by contrast, posed no problem for liberals because the state would
redistribute wealth only after the plaintiff had met a burden of
proof at trial. The personal jurisdiction cases, therefore, would not
lead to the uncritical ratification of private claims.
The liberal ideology of the mid-twentieth century did not seek
a strong state for its own sake. Indeed, out~ide the area of economic regulation, liberals generally opposed state power. 1 Liberals had supported a strong state principally in the economic
sphere, where they believed it necessary to regulate the market.3 18
"'

Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).

815

Id. at 103.

816

See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.

8" See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
818 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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The split between liberals and conservatives also reflects an
ideological disagreement over the private rights that are most deserving of protection. Mid-twentieth century liberal ideology was
willing to defer to the state's regulation of economic activity, but
believed that dignitary interests, such as privacy and expression,
were entitled to strong protection against state intervention.3 19
Late nineteenth century conservatives had been interested primarly in protecting property rights against state intervention, a position which they continue to maintain.32 0 On the other hand, with
respect to dignitary interests, conservatives have been much more
tolerant of state regulation.
In the provisional remedies cases, the threat posed by state
power was not to economic interests. In each case, to obtain a provisional remedy, the plaintiff had to post a bond. In the event that
the prejudgment seizure ultimately was found unjustified, the bond
was available to ensure that the injured defendant would be made
whole.
The real injury threatened by state power was to the dignity
of the defendant who, in the typical case, would be a consumer
sued by a retailer. 21 The liberals sensed that there are some things
money cannot buy. Damages simply would not be sufficient to
compensate the defendant for "arbitrary taking."322 The defendant's right to dignity can be protected only by preventing the
wrongful encroachment by requiring a prior adversarial hearing.
Consistent with mid-twentieth century liberal ideology, Justice
Stewart and the liberal wing of the Court raised the Due Process
Clause as a barrier to state infringement of this dignitary interest.
The conservatives, on the other hand, simply did not see the
provisional remedies cases as anything but disputes over economic
interests. If there was some kind of dignitary interest, it was of
insufficient importance to enter into the calculus. For the conservatives, the typical case involved a plaintiff seeking to enforce a
contractual right obtained through private bargaining. If the plaintiff was right, then the court should seize the goods. If the plaintiff
310See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
321 See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601-02 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 69-70 (1972) (cases involving seizure of personal possessions of private individuals).
But see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 604 (1975) (garnishment of a corporate bank account).
122 See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82.
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was wrong, the bond requirement would ensure that the defendant
was made whole. If the only interests truly deserving of protection
were economic, then it was difficult to see why the provisional remedies statutes should not be upheld.
A recent provisional remedies case, Connecticut v. Doehr,2 s
the first to be decided by the Court since North Georgia Finishing,
suggests that there are limits even to the conservatives' willingness
to hand state power over to private parties. This 1991 decision, by
the now very conservative Supreme Court, unanimously struck
down a Connecticut statute which authorized the prejudgment attachment of real property upon the filing of an affidavit showing
that there was probable cause to sustain the claim. 24
Justice White, writing for the Court as he had in Mitchell and
North Georgia Finishing, explained that the Connecticut statute
in Doehr differed from the Louisiana statute in Mitchell in two
respects.

25

First, Mitchell had involved a vendor's lien in which

the plaintiff's claim would have lent itself to documentary proof,
while Doehr involved a prejudgment attachment in an assault action, which did not "readily lend [itself] to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits." 2 ' Second, the Mitchell statute had required that the plaintiff post a bond, while the Doehr statute did
not.
The Doehr statute, in fact, provided fewer protections for the
defendant than any of the statutes considered in the three other
provisional remedies cases. Even the garnishment statute invalidated in North Georgia Finishing had required the posting of a
bond in double the amount claimed due.327 The Doehr statute thus
was the easiest of the group to invalidate.
CONCLUSION

Both of the major lines of cases applying the Due Process
Clause to civil procedure doctrine reflect ideological divisions on
the Supreme Court that mirror ideological disagreements on substantive doctrine. These ideological disputes' have both political
and jurisprudential dimensions.
-2 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991).
324 Id. at 2161 (failure to provide pre-attachment hearing falls short of due process
demands).
325Id. at 2114-15.
328 Id. at 2115.
"2 North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 603.
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The political dimension reflects a basic disagreement over the
extent of state power. Conservative ideology with its preference for
private, voluntary, market-based decision-making has sought to
limit state regulatory power over defendants who have not intentionally subjected themselves to the power of the state. Thus, in
the personal jurisdiction cases, conservatives have favored reading
the Due Process Clause broadly so that it would permit states to
exercise jurisdiction over only those defendants who have "purposefully" availed themselves of the laws of the forum state in a
way which reflected a relatively strong degree of purposefulness. At
the same time, in the provisional remedies cases, conservatives
have been willing to read the Due Process Clause narrowly so that
it would impose only the weakest limitations on state seizures of
property to secure claims for breaches of contracts into which the
defendants had voluntarily entered.
Liberal ideology, with its enthusiasm for state regulation of economic matters and distrust of the market, has read the Due Process Clause narrowly in the personal jurisdiction cases to permit
states to exercise jurisdiction over defendants involved in economic
disputes whenever it was reasonable in light of state regulatory interests. To the extent that a showing of purposeful availment was
required, the liberals would have required only the most attenuated form of purposefulness. At the same time, liberals have read
the Due Process Clause broadly in the provisional remedies cases
to prevent state courts from blindly delegating state power to private plaintiffs seeking to enforce contractual remedies.
Thus, neither liberals nor conservatives have adhered consistently to either a broad or a narrow reading of the Due Process
Clause, but have read it in different ways depending upon the setting. Where liberals and conservatives are consistent is in their approach to state regulation of private economic conduct-a realm in
which their formulation of civil procedure doctrine under the Due
Process Clause parallels closely their formulation of substantive
doctrine in both public and private law.
The jurisprudential dimension reflects a basic disagreement
over the form of judicial decision-making. Conservative ideology,
with its preference for rule formalism, has attempted to formulate
civil procedure doctrine, to the extent possible as a system of rigid
rules, while liberal ideology, with its characteristic skepticism
about rules, has preferred to construct doctrine utilizing flexible
standards. The techniques preferred by liberals and conservatives
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in formulating civil procedure doctrine under the Due Process
Clause mirror those that they have used in constructing substantive legal doctrine.
Supreme Court decisions have shown and -will continue to
show that civil procedure is not a discrete body of doctrine insulated from the ideological clashes that dominate substantive law.
Assumptions about freedom, equality, the role of the state, and the
nature of adjudication that shape the evolution of substantive law
also have shaped the development of civil procedure.

